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LEGISLATIVE KUDZU AND THE NEW
MILLENNIUM: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR
REFLECTION AND REFORM
PATRICK K. HETRICK*
"Now, 0 King, establish the decree, and sign the writing, that it be not
changed, according to the law of the Medes and Persians, which alter-
eth not."'
I. INTRODUCTION
North Carolinians have come a long way in two and a half centu-
ries from several thin volumes of general statutes bound in what Dick-
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University Law School. He joined the law faculty at Campbell University in 1978. He is
one of two revising authors of Webster's Real Estate Law in North Carolina and North
Carolina Real Estate for Brokers and Salesmen. Professor Hetrick has delivered more
than one hundred CLE presentations and is the author of numerous CLE manuscripts.
A former member of the General Statutes Commission and a former vice president of
the North Carolina Bar Association, he is currently serving on several North Carolina
Bar Association and American Bar Association committees, and is the Chair of the
ABA Section on Legal Education's Continuing Education Committee. He currently
teaches Property I and II, a seminar titled "Legislation Affecting Real Estate", and
another titled "Selected Issues in Education Law".
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ens aptly described as "that under-done-pie-crust-coloured cover."2
Succeeding generations of lawmakers have added to the original quaint
base of legislation and have also dismantled much of the common law,
replacing it with twenty volumes of slick-looking green statute books
adorned with gold print and the "Great Seal" of the State of North
Carolina. Doubtless, most legislators of the past two centuries have
had good intentions. Yet, in fact, and in the application of these twenty
green volumes of laws to a modern, complex society, numerous nega-
tive consequences and unintended side effects have resulted. Unfortu-
nately, the exuberance and pride that appear to exist in drafting and
enacting statutes do not continue insofar as the repeal or corrective
functions of a legislature are concerned.
Throughout this article, I will address issues related to laws and
lawmaking by using real property laws as an example. I do this
because I am familiar with real property laws and feel comfortable
illustrating points by referring to statutes in that important substan-
tive area of law. While real property statutes constitute but one sub-
stantive framework for critically analyzing the North Carolina General
Statutes and the process by which statutes are enacted and evaluated,
my comments and criticisms are equally applicable to all of the green
volumes.3
While there is much that is logical about North Carolina statutory
law on the topic of real property, there is also much that might be
placed in a "nettlesome hodge-podge" category. About two decades
ago, some frustrated practitioners of property law blamed complica-
tions in the practice of law on an inadequate index to the North Caro-
lina General Statutes. Although there was merit in the criticism, the
complaints did not address the true problem-the existence of what I
will call troublesome statutes. The focus on index problems was mis-
2. Charles Dickens, Pickwick Papers, ch. xxxiv. Dickens would be pleased to
know that two hundred years of aging of the original law-calf covers produces a
wonderful antique patina, perhaps an "over-done-pie-crust-coloured cover."
3. This article is limited to a discussion of North Carolina law because I am
optimistic that concerned members of the bar and citizens can still do something at
the state level. The United States Code, with its accompanying myriad of so-called
implementing regulations, contains the most egregious examples of legislative and
administrative overkill. The now-staggering volume of practically useless and
unnecessary laws drives up the cost of legal services and has the aggravating effect of
complicating what once were straightforward and simple transactions. Allow me to
save a discussion of federal law for a future article. It suffices to say that the
unnecessary federal laws affecting real property ownership and real estate
transactions generally are legion, and I fear that the United States Congress is unable
to do anything but add to the morass.
158 [Vol. 23:157
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placed, somewhat akin to blaming the inadequacy of road signs for a
bumpy road. The advent of computerized search-and-retrieve tech-
niques has effectively eliminated most problems with respect to locat-
ing statutory provisions on point. If it ever was a pressing problem,
the search itself is not one any longer; instead, it is what one discovers
at the end of the search-the statute itself-that can cause challenges.
Indeed, it is this wonderful ability to instantly search and locate stat-
utes related to any given problem or issue that allows one to discover
just how many statutes there are and how many we could do without.
In some respects, legislation has a great deal in common with
kudzu. Legislative kudzu, like its botanical counterpart, "grows like
the devil" and "just will not die."4 One ill-advised, poorly drafted or
obsolete statute, for example, can result in a proliferation of other stat-
utes enacted to make adjustments or clarifications.' The inevitable
and necessary "judicial gloss" contributes to the kudzu thicket insofar
as some of the more problematic statutes on the books are concerned.
Confusing and at times incomprehensible statutes entwine themselves
4. See Doug Stewart, Kudzu Love It- Or Run: The lush, aggressive weed that "grows
like the devil" and just will not die is manna for sheep, cows and folks who use it to cure
hangovers, weave baskets and make jelly, Smithsonian, Oct. 1, 2000, at 64. Another
author has recently made use of the kudzu analogy in an article about legislation. See
Robert C. Ellickson, Taming Leviathan: Will The Centralizing Tide Of The Twentieth
Century Continue Into The Twenty-First? 74 South. Cal. L. Rev. 101, 105 (2000) ("State
and local law also have grown like kudzu.") See also Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Grant, 355 F. Supp. 280 (E.D.N.C. 1973), in which District Judge
Larkins took judicial notice of the nature and dangers of kudzu, and astutely
observed:
Although one may not know what it is called, a person does not have to be a
scientist to recognize kudzu. One can frequently see kudzu along roads and
highways. Most likely it can be seen growing on banks, stretching over
shrubs and underbrush, engulfing trees, small and large, short and tall,
slowly destroying and snuffing out the life of its unwilling host. Even
manmade structures are susceptible to the vine-the tall slender green tree
may be your telephone pole. However, if controlled, kudzu may have erosion
value.
Id. Judge Larkin went on to hold that an environmental impact statement filed
concerning the construction of a watershed project failed to satisfy the National
Environmental Policy Act where the impact statement disclosed that "[olne row of
kudzu will be planted at the very top edge of the channel slope through cultivated
areas. The growth of kudzu will be controlled by mechanical methods." This impact
statement, according to Judge Larkin, failed "to disclose how the growth of kudzu can
be controlled by mechanical or any other methods and in this respect fails to satisfy
the requirements of NEPA." Id. at 280, 288.
5. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-30, which will be discussed extensively in this article, is a
prime example of legislative kudzu.
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around the day-to-day transactions of humankind and clog what would
otherwise be simple problems or challenges with confusion.6 The neg-
ative effects of bad statutes at the grassroots level of the practice of law
often go unreported. The actual effect of a given statute in terms of
utility and cost to the client is virtually ignored. As will be discussed
in more detail later in this article, lawyers and professors tend to evalu-
ate the worth and effect of a statute by studying appellate court deci-
sions. This "top-down" technique provides only one helpful but
incomplete representation of the true state of affairs in terms of how a
statute is operating in the day-to-day world.
The leading discussion of the proliferation of legislation and the
effect of outdated statutes in American law was made by professor and
then-dean Guido Calabresi in a 1982 book titled "A Common Law
For The Age of Statutes."7 In this book, Calabresi describes the
"statutorification" of American law" as an orgy of statute-making.9 He
addresses the challenges of statutory obsolescence and discusses the
circumstances in which obsolete statutes may be judicially
over ruled. 10
Two decades after the publication of Calabresi's observations have
brought about little more than an intensification of the challenges
posed both by the continuing existence of vague or obsolete statutes
6. As I read and reread and then read again and outlines N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-67,
the "Neighborhood public roads" statute, and reflect on questions I have received from
attorneys in regard to the interpretation of this statute, I am figuratively, if not literally,
awestricken by how complex and confusing a simple matter can be made by a statute
passed in good faith to clarify things. For the latest appellate court decision
demonstrating the futility of trying to prove that a "neighborhood public road" exists,
see Coghill v. Oxford Sporting Goods, Inc., 2001 WL 503057 (N.C. App. 2001).
7. Guido Calabresi, A Common Law For The Age of Statutes (Harvard University
Press 1982). See also Thomas W. Mayo, Symposium on Statutory Interpretation, 53
SMU L. Rev. 3 (2000);Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective In The Administrative
State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference With The Judiciary's Structural Role, 53
Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2000); Anthony D'Amato, The Injustice of Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, 64 U. Cin. L. Rev. 911 (1996);Judith S. Kay, State Courts at the Dawn of
a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1 (1995); William N. EskridgeJr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1007 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State,
103 Harv. L. Rev. 405 (1989); Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce Jr., Sunstein's New
Canons: Choosing the Fictions of Statutory Interpretation, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203
(1990); Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal
Process, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 213 (1983); Allan C. Hutchinson & Derek Morgan,
Calabresian Sunset: Statutes in the Shade, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1752 (1982).
8. Calabresi, supra note 7.
9. Id. (giving Grant Gilmore credit for the description).
10. Id. at 163-166.
[Vol. 23:157
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and by the unabated trend of enacting new statutes. In terms of the
proliferation issue, my favorite article on point is a summary of a
speech given in 1978 by Dallin Oaks, then-president of Brigham Young
University, to the Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference." Basing his ideas
on reasoning from variations on Parkinson's Law, Oaks developed a
number of theories of lawmaking. Oak's "three laws or principles of
lawmaking": "(1) Law expands in proportion to the resources available
for its enforcement; (2) bad law is more likely to be supplemented than
repealed; and (3) social legislation cannot repeal physical laws."' 2
Oaks also suggests that "an uninformed lawmaker is more likely to
produce a complicated law than a simple one.' ' 3
While acknowledging that the recent arrival of the new millen-
nium has already become symbolic of too many things for too many
people, I will nonetheless join the club and make use of it as an oppor-
tunity for reflection, assessment, and suggestions regarding North Car-
olina real property law and law in general. In this article, I will
address a number of matters, such as the need for a housecleaning of
the North Carolina General Statutes, the effect of a proliferation of leg-
islation on legal education and the general practitioner, and the short-
comings of "top-down" statutory analysis and evaluation. I will also
include some thoughts on statutory design and make suggestions
related to the enlisting of computer technology and attorney-practi-
tioner input to evaluate and analyze the practical effect of legislation.
As noted above, I will be limiting my discussion to real property legis-
lation and examples, although my observations should be valid when
applied to other substantive areas of law.
Each professor approaches his or her writing with the circum-
scribed objectivity of a uniquely acquired subjectivity, and my precon-
ceptions will be soon be manifest to all. I would like this article to
qualify as much as a gut-reaction/seat-of-the-pants commentary on
practical matters of interest to me and, I hope, to members of the prac-
ticing bar, as it does any attempt at a detached, pseudo-scientific dis-
cussion of legal theory as it relates to legislation. I shall leave it to
other members of the legal academy to attempt to at least figuratively
extract jurisprudential sunbeams out of cucumbers. 14 The reader is of
course welcome to wholeheartedly agree or vehemently disagree, as the
11. Dallin H. Oaks, Unruly Laws for Lawmakers, 26 La. BJ. 18 (1978).
12. Id. at 22.
13. Id. at 19.
14. In Jonathan Swift's Gulliver's Travels, a visit to the grand Academy of Lagado is
noted in Chapter V. The first "projector" or scholar encountered is described, in part,
as follows:
2001]
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case may be, and your feedback and input is invited.15 Indeed, I would
thoroughly enjoy an ongoing discussion of the actual influence and
effect of legislation on our professional and personal lives.16
II. PRIME CANDIDATES FOR A STATUTORY HIT LIST
To get the ball rolling on a discussion of statutes that are, to be
kind, "past their prime", I am going to focus on several of my top
choices for repeal. Dozens of other statutes dealing with real property
law also merit membership on any housekeeping hit list. Some of
them will be briefly mentioned in this article and may be the subject of
future articles. Again, North Carolina practicing lawyers are
encouraged to share their insights on problem statutes. For now, let's
focus on several prime candidates for the shredder.
A. Repeal N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-30 (The "Statutory Replacement for
Dower" Statute)
Let's start this discussion with a concrete example of a statute that
has been a thorn in the side of real property practitioners (and profes-
sors) for slightly more than four decades: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-30,
titled "Election of surviving spouse to take life interest in lieu of intes-
tate share provided." This statute spans several pages of the North
Carolina General Statutes and boasts ten sections and sixteen subsec-
The first man I saw was of meager aspect, with sooty hands and face, his hair
and beard long, ragged and singed in several places. His cloathes, shirt, and
skin were all of the same colour. He had been eight years upon a project for
extracting sun-beams out of cucumbers, which were to be put into vials
hermetically sealed, and let out to warm the air in raw inclement summers.
15. The author can be reached by e-mail at: hetrick@webster.campbell.edu or at
the following address: Campbell University, Norman Adrian Wiggins School of Law,
P.O. Box 158, Buies Creek, N.C. 27506. Of course, the ideas expressed in this article
are the personal and professional views of the author.
16. I regularly writes to attorneys involved in appellate cases and seeks their input
concerning matters related to the dispute that seemed of significance to the attorney
but might not have made their way into the written appellate decision. One response
that I received related to an education law (rather than a property law) dispute. It
involved, among other things, a lawsuit by a teacher against a high school and its
principal. One of the questions that I asked related to the fact that the litigation had
bounced around in the federal court system for more than five years. The plaintiff's
attorney's response was interesting. He noted that the plaintiff-teacher and defendant-
principal had reconciled in terms of their personal and professional relationship with
each other and that both had become disgruntled and frustrated by the nature of the
legal system and the complicated and seemingly never-ending litigation and appellate
process. It is sadly ironic that the plaintiff died before the case was ultimately resolved.
[Vol. 23:157
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tions, but the meat of it can be found in subsections (a) and (b), which
read as follows:
(a) In lieu of the share provided in G. S. 29-14 or 29-21, the surviving
spouse of an intestate or the surviving spouse who dissents from the
will of a testator shall be entitled to take as his or her intestate share a
life estate in one third in value of all the real estate of which the
deceased spouse was seized and possessed of an estate of inheritance
at any time during coverture, except that real estate as to which the
surviving spouse:
Has waived his or her rights by joining with the other spouse in a con-
veyance thereof, or
Has released or quitclaimed his or her interest therein in accordance
with G.S. 52-10, or
Was not required by law to join in conveyance thereof in order to bar
the elective life estate, or
Is otherwise not legally entitled to the election provided in this section.
(b) Regardless of the value thereof and despite the fact that a life estate
therein might exceed the fractional limitation provided for in subsec-
tion (a), the life estate provided for in subsection (a) shall at the elec-
tion of the surviving spouse include a life estate in the usual dwelling
house occupied by the surviving spouse at the time of death of the
deceased spouse if such dwelling house were owned by the deceased
spouse at the time of his or her death, together with the outbuildings,
improvements and easements thereunto belonging or appertaining,
and lands upon which situated and reasonably necessary to the use
and enjoyment thereof, as well as a fee simple ownership in the house-
hold furnishings therein. 17
In the practical world of real estate transactions, N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 29-30 must be read in conjunction with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-7. Sub-
section (a) of that statute reads as follows:
(a) In order to waive the elective life estate of either husband or wife as
provided for in G.S. 29-30, every conveyance or other instrument
affecting the estate, right or title of any married person in lands, tene-
ments or hereditaments must be executed by such husband or wife,
and due proof or acknowledgment thereof must be made and certified
as provided by law.1 8
The original idea behind N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-30, as with almost
all statutes, was a well-intentioned one. When the North Carolina Gen-
17. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-30 (2001).
18. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-7(a) (2001). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-7(c) enumerates
exceptions where other sections of the N.C. General Statutes provide for them. These
other sections include, but are not limited to, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 39-13, 39-13.3, 39-
13.4, 31A-1(d), and 52-10. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-7(b) also contains special provisions
related to a situation where one spouse is incompetent.
2001]
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eral Assembly enacted a new intestate succession law in 1959, it prop-
erly saw fit to abolish both dower and curtesy as they existed at
common law.19 Abolition of those ancient spousal rights in their com-
mon law form was necessary because they constituted blatant exam-
ples of gender discrimination against the wife. Replacing common law
dower and curtesy with a uniform and objectively fair "statutory"
dower and curtesy was a logical and understandable legislative senti-
ment in 1959. While we now have the benefit of hindsight, it is evi-
dent that the sponsors of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-30 did not foresee a
number of practical issues and problems.
First, and this is important if laws are to be of some pragmatic
value, it is extremely rare (and unheard of in some North Carolina
counties) for a spouse to elect his or her life interest in one-third of the
property of the deceased spouse under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-30.20 This
is the case because a surviving spouse must affirmatively elect the
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-30 life estate option rather than select an intestate
share or share provided for in the decedent spouse's will. To be blunt,
the statute has served no useful purpose for any meaningful number of
surviving spouses in slightly more than forty years of its existence.
This lack of any day-to-day utility in the law and practice of wills and
estates stands in stark contrast to the millions of times through the last
four decades that a non-owning spouse has been required to sign away
his or her N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-30 rights so that marketable title can be
conveyed by the other spouse.
Second, what if the non-owning spouse refuses to sign? All kinds
of legal problems can result. Legitimate transactions are threafened,
not to mention the effect of this discord on the marriage itself. A case
on point that has arrived at "real property law cult classic status," if
there is such a thing, is Taylor v. Bailey.21 In that case, the plaintiff-
vendee sought damages for breach of a contract to convey real property
which was encumbered by an inchoate dower interest of the vendor's
wife. Simply put, the vendor's wife (not a party to the contract to con-
vey) apparently refused to sign the deed to the property solely owned
19. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-4 (2000).
20. In Heller v. Heller, 7 N.C. App. 120, 171 S.E.2d 335 (1969), the court held,
among other things, that the widow's right to elect her dower interest under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 29-30 had expired. Thus, examples of persons asserting their rights under N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 29-30 do exist, although they are extremely rare. As discussed later in this
article, computer data can be generated to reveal precisely how many times N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 29-30 has actually come into play.
21. 49 N.C. App. 216, 271 S.E.2d 296 (1980).
164 [Vol. 23:157
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by her husband. In discussing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-30, Judge Harry
C. Martin observed, in part:
This section preserves to a surviving spouse the benefits that were for-
merly available as dower and curtesy. A surviving spouse is given this
election so as not to be rendered penniless and would elect this option
when the estate is small or insolvent. The statute limits the right of a
married person to convey his or her real property free from the elective
life estate provided by this section. Thus, Norma Bailey's dower inter-
est in the property would become effective only if she were to survive
defendant and make an affirmative election to take this option rather
than her intestate share or her share as provided by his will.22
Judge Martin continued by noting that the inchoate dower interest
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-30 is not an estate in land nor a vested
interest. 23 Nevertheless, it acts as an encumbrance on real property
when the signature of the spouse is lacking. The case ultimately
turned on procedure, with the court holding that the purchaser, who
had obtained a judgment against the seller for specific performance of
property encumbered by the inchoate dower interest, could not then
sue for damages for breach of contract. Instead, the purchaser under
these circumstances was limited in damages to a reduction in purchase
price for the present value of the inchoate dower encumbrance.
In a memorable dissent, Judge Clark disagreed. The procedure,
according to the dissenting opinion, was to be interpreted as follows:
plaintiff originally sought specific performance of the contract, and
there was nothing in the first action to indicate that the vendor was
unable to perform. After the first appeal of this matter to the North
Carolina Court of Appeals, the vendee determined that the vendor
could not perform because of his wife's refusal to sign a deed releasing
her dower interest. Judge Clark concluded that the vendee then had
the option to either sue for specific performance plus the cash value of
the inchoate right of dower of the wife, or sue for breach of contract
following the usual damages formula when contracts to convey are
involved. According to Judge Clark, the plaintiff-vendee was no longer
relying on specific performance and was not seeking both specific per-
formance and damages for breach; rather, he was seeking only dam-
ages for breach.24
The dissent is memorable for its final paragraph, in which Judge
Clark accuses the majority of basing its opinion on what might be
termed high-altitude jurisprudence. That paragraph reads as follows:
22. Id. at 219, 271 S.E.2d at 298.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 225, 271 S.E.2d at 301.
20011
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My colleagues of the majority are mountain men. The land in question
is located in the mountains. It is possible that their opinion is based
on "mountain law," a body of law peculiar to western North Carolina
which permeates the innermost recess of the minds of those who live
in that rarefied atmosphere and which may not be fully dispelled from
the minds of some mountaineers despite exposure to law of general
application throughout the State.2 5
But whether you dwell in the mountains or the flatlands, Taylor v.
Bailey represents a wonderful illustration of what is wrong with retain-
ing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-30 in the statute books. This controversy
bounced around in the courts for more than five years and ended up at
the North Carolina Court of Appeals twice.2 6 Reading between the
lines, the real problem in this case appears to be a vendor who had
changed his mind and then, after remand from the first court of
appeals decision affirming a decree of specific performance, suddenly
encountered the surprising problem of his wife's refusal to sign the
deed. Since she had not signed the contract to convey, there was noth-
ing that the court could do about that refusal.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-30 also has an additional unintended side
effect. While enacted as part of a statutory reform to bring equality to
the sexes by correcting the glaring disparity between the benefits of
common law curtesy as opposed to dower, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-30
actually prolongs inequality between the sexes. De facto inequality
persists because the statute has a tendency to give the husband a psy-
chological veto power over proposed real estate transactions of the wife
involving the wife's solely owned property. My contention that this is
the case is more than merely theoretical, because I have observed this
unintended effect in a number of North Carolina real estate transac-
tions." 7 To the extent that there is merit to my observations in this
25. Id. at 225, 271 S.E.2d at 302.
26. The first Taylor v. Bailey court of appeals case can be found at 34 N.C. App.
290, 237 S.E.2d 918 (1977). As of that stage in the controversy, the vendor had
refused to convey cited problems with the legal description and asserting that time was
of the essence as to the closing date. The trial court rejected these defenses and
ordered specific performance. The court of appeals affirmed.
27. See, e.g., Melvin v. Mills-Melvin, 126 N.C. App. 543, 486 S.E.2d 84 (1997), in
which the wife executed a deed of property solely owned by her to a third party. Her
husband did not sign the deed. The court correctly concluded that she was perfectly
free to convey solely owned real property without her husband's signature, but the sale
was subject to the inchoate right of the husband who might some day elect his
statutory life estate under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-30. While this case illustrates that a
wife does not need her husband's signature, it also demonstrates an attitude on the
husband's part that a wife should not convey real property, even if solely owned,
without her husband's blessing.
[Vol. 23:157
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regard, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-30 in part perpetuates the common law
situation where the husband controlled all real property including that
solely owned by his wife during marriage. In North Carolina, surviv-
ing spouses often enjoy protection from creditors far superior to that
theoretically provided by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-30. The continuing
vitality and widespread use of the tenancy by the entirety form of con-
current ownership of real property very effectively protects a surviving
spouse from the creditors of the decedent spouse. While subsection
(b) of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-30 limits the scope of what we are calling
"statutory dower" to a mere life estate in the dwelling house and speci-
fied surrounding property, the tenancy by the entirety almost univer-
sally results in fee simple ownership and is only limited in North
Carolina by the confines of the definition of real property.2" It is possi-
ble, therefore, for a surviving tenant by the entirety to solely own in fee
simple absolute, free and clear of the creditors of the decedent spouse,
a $700,000 family home in North Raleigh, a valuable farm in Johnston
County, a beach cottage on Bald Head Island, and a mountain chalet
in Blowing Rock. Indeed, a shopping center or industrial park can be
owned by husband and wife as tenants by the entirety.2 9 Whatever the
reader's reaction to the effect of ownership of real property in a ten-
ancy by the entirety format, one thing is clear: tenancy by the entirety
constitutes a practical and superior method of protecting a surviving
spouse from the creditors of the decedent spouse.3 ° In a sense, the
tenancy by the entirety form of ownership has played a major role in
transforming N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-30 into a purely theoretical right
rendered meaningless in practical terms because of a far better
alternative. 3
1
This is not to suggest that dower is completely useless as a con-
cept. Continuing the analogy to kudzu, it can creep into legal disputes
in unexpected ways that are sometimes beneficial. In a recent federal
28. With limited exceptions not important for this discussion, a tenancy by the
entirety in personal property is not recognized in North Carolina.
29. From the standpoint of creditors' rights, an outcome that protects more than
the family home through the fiction of the tenancy by the entirety is open to well-
deserved criticism.
30. Of course a surviving spouse might have assumed liability in one way or
another for the debt of the other spouse. In that event, creditors can reach what was
once tenancy by the entirety property that is now in the hands of the survivor. That
scenario is a common one, but it also negates any protection from creditors under N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 29-30(a)(1). Clearly, a surviving spouse who signs on the dotted line
waives rights against creditors under either theory.
31. The North Carolina homestead exemption is also rendered impotent by the
tenancy by the entirety and by the limits of that exemption.
20011
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district court decision,32 civil forfeiture proceedings were commenced
by the federal government against a family home located in Massachu-
setts that was solely owned by the husband. Massachusetts, like North
Carolina, has a statutory provision that gives a surviving spouse a
dower interest for life in one-third of the property. The home con-
tained an apartment that had been used by the husband for drug deal-
ing without his wife's knowledge. When her husband was arrested,
she of course became aware of his prior drug activities. Soon thereaf-
ter, the husband committed suicide and devised the property to her
under his will. The federal district court granted a directed verdict to
the government at the close of the government's evidence, and denied
the wife's motion for entry of judgment in her favor on the basis that
the wife was not an "innocent owner" of the property due to the fact
that she did not acquire an interest in her husband's property until
after she had become aware of her husband's illicit activities. 33 The
wife appealed. The court of appeals judge held that the wife had a
sufficient ownership interest during her husband's lifetime in the
home titled solely in her husband's name by virtue of her dower inter-
est under Massachusetts law. This dower interest, in turn, allowed her
to maintain an innocent owner defense to the forfeiture of the real
property to the extent of that statutory right. Significantly, the court
also held that the purposes behind civil forfeiture laws would not be
served by enforcing a forfeiture of that portion of the property that was
not protected by the innocent owner defense. 34 To be fair, therefore, it
32. U.S. v. 221 Dana Ave., 239 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2001).
33. U.S. v. 221 Dana Ave., 81 F. Supp. 2d 182 (D. Mass. 2000).
34. 239 F.3d. 78, 88-89. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit notes, in part:
We do not know whether the government, if it had recognized that Mrs. Gass
was an innocent owner of a one-third interest, would have exercised its
prosecutorial discretion to attempt to forfeit any arguable remaining interest.
In fact, the government's forfeiture papers claim only an interest in the entire
property, not a lesser interest. We have little reason to assume the
government would have done so, given the equities of the situation. But
assuming arguendo the government intends the present action to reach any
remaining interests, such effort fails because forfeiture would not, on these
facts, serve any congressional purpose behind the forfeiture statute.
It is far from clear that Congress intended the forfeiture statute to
preempt state laws governing family property arrangements. The Supreme
Court has said in another context that such laws may be overridden by
federal courts only where "clear and substantial interests of the National
Government, which cannot be served consistently with respect for such state
interests [in the field of family and family-property arrangements], will suffer
major damage if the state law is applied." United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S.
341, 352 (1966). What is clear to us, for the reasons which follow, is that the
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must be admitted that the statutory form of dower may occasionally-
very occasionally-serve a positive public purpose. At he same time, it
should be emphasized that the side effect that dower rights might have
on civil forfeiture proceedings provides no strong public policy ratio-
nale for maintaining statutory dower. The kudzu analogy can once
again be utilized. Like kudzu, one statutory root, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-
30, has entwined itself around and complicated other areas of prop-
erty law and even required clarifying amendments to other portions of
the North Carolina General Statutes. Statutory amendments to con-
form North Carolina real property law to the repercussions of a statute
that is full of cobwebs. For example, statutes dealing with concurrent
ownership needed to be clarified in light of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-30. 3"
Other statutes dealing with conveyancing must also reckon with the
statute.36
federal interests would not suffer major damage from applying state law or
from denying forfeiture. (citations omitted; italics in original).
Id. at 88-89.
35. See, for example, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-13.3. Subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) of
that statute read as follows:
(a) A conveyance from a husband or wife to the other spouse of real property
or any interest therein owned by the grantor alone vests such property or
interest in the grantee.
(b) A conveyance of real property, or any interest therein, by a husband or a
wife to such husband and wife vests the same in the husband and wife as
tenants by the entirety unless a contrary intention is expressed in the
conveyance.
(c) A conveyance from, a husband or a wife to the other spouse of real
property, or any interest therein, held by such husband and wife as tenants
by the entirety dissolves such tenancy in the property or interest conveyed
and vests such property or interest formerly held by the entirety in the
grantee.
(d) The joinder of the spouse of the grantor in any conveyance made by a
husband or wife pursuant to the foregoing provisions of this section is not
necessary. (Emphasis added.)
Subsection (d) was necessary, at least from the standpoint of cautious legislative
drafting, because N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-30 would dictate that the spouse of the grantor
in subsections (a), (b), and (c) of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-13.3 would be required to sign
the deed in order to waive his or her statutory dower rights.
36. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-13.4, "Conveyances by husband or wife under deed of
separation." See also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-13.2(d), validating certain conveyances
renouncing dower or curtesy or rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-30. See also N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 39-12, "Power of attorney of married person," which provides:
Every competent married person of lawful age is authorized to execute,
without the joinder of his or her spouse, instruments creating powers of
attorney affecting the real and personal property of such married person
naming either third parties, or subject to the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat.
13
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N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-30 can also result in challenges for the title
examiner who comes across a conveyance in the chain of title in which
only one person has signed as grantor and in which there is no indica-
tion of the marital status of that grantor. A statute that is triggered on
only the most rare of occasions thus provides a daily headache for title
examiners.
Solution? Repeal N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-30! It serves no utilitarian
purpose, has declined to almost complete disuse, and yet unnecessa-
rily complicates millions of real estate transfers and documents in the
day-to-day practice of law. This statute would not be enacted if pro-
posed for the first time today and is wholly inconsistent with the con-
temporary legal landscape. To borrow a thought from a recent
federal court decision, it is ironic that it is we who plant this kudzu in
the fertile soil of North Carolina jurisprudence.38
B. Repeal N.C. Gen. Stat. 45-21.38 (The "Anti-Deficiency Statute")
The so-called "anti-deficiency" statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.38,
is another example of a law ripe for complete elimination from the
North Carolina General Statutes. Passed in the midst of the Great
Depression for the apparent purpose of protecting debtors from poten-
tial abuses in certain kinds of seller-financed real estate transactions,39
this statute has in my opinion long outlived any meaningful purpose,
§ 52-10 or 52-10.1, his or her spouse as attorney-in-fact. When such a
married person executes a power of attorney authorized by the preceding
sentence naming his or her spouse as attorney in fact the acknowledgment by
the spouse of the grantor is not necessary. Such instruments may confer
upon the attorney, and the attorney may exercise, any and all powers which
lawfully can be conferred upon an attorney-in-fact, including, but not limited
to, the authority to join in conveyances of real property for the purpose of
waiving or quitclaiming any rights which may be acquired as a surviving
spouse under the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. 29-30.
37. Calabresi, supra note 6, at 2. ("[L]aws are governing us that would not and
could not be enacted today, and that some of these laws not only could not be
reenacted today but also do not fit, are in some sense inconsistent with, our whole
legal landscape.")
38. Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1289 (9th Cir. 1999). Judge
Kozinski's dissent in this Copyright Act case actually reads in part: "It is ironic that it
is we who plant this kudzu in the fertile soil of our federal system. We pass up yet
another opportunity to root out this weed. Instead, we feed it Miracle-Gro."
39. See Ross Realty Co. v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 296 N.C. 366, 250
S.E.2d 271 (1979); Webster's Real Estate in North Carolina § 13-46(a) (Patrick K.
Hetrick & James B. McLaughlin, Jr. eds., 5th ed. 1999); John Mixon & Ira B. Shepard,
Ant ideficiency Relief For Foreclosed Homeowners: ULSLA Section 511(b), 27 Wake Forest
L. Rev. 455 (1992); Currie and Lieberman, Purchase-Money Mortgages and State Lines:
A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 1960 DuKE L.J. 1 (1960).
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has become a litigation and dispute magnet, and is easily evaded by
skillful design of the financing transaction.40 In addition, there is evi-
dence that the statute periodically serves as a vehicle for a sophisti-
cated purchaser of real estate to take advantage of a less-informed
seller. 4 ' Lack of understanding and compliance with the requirements
of the statute have also resulted in complaints of attorney
malpractice.42
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.38 provides in pertinent part:
In all sales of real property by mortgagees and/or trustees under pow-
ers of sale contained in any mortgage or deed of trust ... to secure to
the seller the payment of the balance of the purchase price of real prop-
erty, the mortgagee or trustee or holder of the notes secured by such
mortgage or deed of trust shall not be entitled to a deficiency judgment
on account of such mortgage, deed of trust or obligation secured by
the same ....
Furthermore, the original foundational premise for the statute-
that purchasers are less protected in seller-financed transactions than
40. Some highly respected members of the real property bar may take issue with
my plea to repeal N.C. Gen. Stat. 45-21.38.
41. The underlying transaction forming the basis for the malpractice action in
Smith v. Childs, 112 N.C. App. 672, 437 S.E.2d 500 (1993) provides one recent
example. The author has firsthand knowledge of a transaction in North Carolina
where the sellers, an elderly couple, conveyed land and received a minimal down
payment. The seller financed the transaction with a purchase money deed of trust,
and also subordinated that deed of trust to a construction loan of considerable
magnitude secured by a deed of trust. The trade-off was supposedly the security the
couple would receive from monthly payments on the note over a period of time. When
the project went sour, the sellers were left with nothing. The purchaser was a
sophisticated real-estate investor. For a reported example of a similar transaction, see
Greene v. Carpenter, Wilson, Cannon and Blair, 119 N.C. App. 415, 458 S.E.2d 507
(1995), in which a business property (a speedway) was sold by the plaintffs-vendors to
a partnership for $1,000,000. The partnership executed a promissory note to the
vendors for $500,000, secured by a purchase money deed of trust. The deed of trust
was, in turn, subordinated to a $400,000 mortgage and note to a bank. At a
subsequent foreclosure sale, all that remained to cover the $500,000 debt owed to the
plaintiffs was $4,120. The plaintiffs did not bid at the sale because they lacked
sufficient funds. Plaintiffs commenced a malpractice action against their attorney,
alleging that the nature of a purchase money mortgage was never explained to them.
The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in granting the attorney's motion
for a directed verdict on the ground that the vendors failed to properly prove their
damages.
42. See, e.g., Greene, 119 N.C. App. 415, 458 S.E.2d 507 (1995); Smith v. Childs,
112 N.C. App. 672, 437 S.E.2d 500 (1993). A recent California case involves a
complaint against attorneys for failing to raise the anti-deficiency judgment statute as a
defense. Crookall v. Davis, 65 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1048, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 250 (Cal.
App. 2 Dist. 1998).
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in third-party financed transactions-rings hollow in terms of current
practice today. This is the case because third-party financed transac-
tions now appear to have more relaxed standards when it comes to
property valuation than those of a generation ago. Competition among
institutions wishing to lend money to finance home purchases is
intense. Like it or not, appraisers can be selected to make the value of
the sales price meet the expectations of the third-party lender even
though the true fair market value of the property being financed is
significantly less. 43 How often do conventional loans by third-party
lenders involving residential real estate sales transactions fall through
because of a low appraisal? In the current mortgage-lending climate,
including the advent of e-mortgages, a consumer can obtain a mort-
gage if he or she wants to purchase the property and has an adequate
credit rating. The appraised value of the property, at least in the over-
whelming majority of real estate sales transactions, will somehow meet
the requirements of both purchaser and third-party lender.
A 1991 federal district court decision involving a law suit against
a number of real estate agents brought by a former major league base-
ball pitcher 44 provides insight into what sometimes goes on in the area
of real estate appraisals. In this case, after the prospective purchasers
made an offer of $520,000 on a home in Chapel Hill, the prospective
lender, the State Employees Credit Union, required an appraisal.
Based upon a calculation of square footage significantly lower than the
real estate agent's estimate, Pam Davis, the person selected to do the
appraisal for the lender, concluded that the correct appraised value
was below the market-value range arrived at by the agent. District
Judge Bullock summarizes the ensuing scenario, in part, as follows:
Davis contacted Defendant Morris . . . to inform Morris that Davis'
calculation of the square footage was 4,212 feet, significantly less than
Robbins', and that Davis' appraised value for the home would not
equal the value Robbins had previously calculated for the CMA. Plain-
tiffs assert that David Collins, who represented the state Employees
Credit Union, refused to allow Robbins to do an appraisal for the home
due to Robbins' conflict of interests in the transaction. In addition,
Morris wrote in her journal on October 16, 1986, "[I] am sick of David
C. saying, 'Don't you pump up an appraisal."' At some point thereafter,
Morris also entered a note in her journal that Davis was becoming hos-
tile due to pressure from Robbins. Plaintiffs allege that Robbins pres-
sured Davis to make her appraisal and square footage measurements
43. One recent example of this captured in the appellate decisions is John v.
Robbins, 764 F. Supp. 379 (M.D.N.C. 1991).
44. John, 764 F. Supp. at 379.
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more consistent with Robbins' CMA calculations. Sally John testified
that Morris called on October 15, 1986, to inform her, "Pam could not
get the appraisal to come out close to the purchase price." Sally John
further testified she told Morris that, while she simply wanted the
house, Tommy John wanted the appraisal to "come up close [to the]
purchase price for the business side of it." Morris responded that Rob-
bins could do an appraisal of the home. Morris later called Plaintiffs
to inform them Robbins' appraisal was $520,000, and represented
Davis' lower figures as the result of her "inexperience" and failure to
consider the home's Timberline roof and other quality features. The
State Employees Credit Union declined to lend Plaintiffs funds to
purchase the house.4 5
While the John v. Robbins case did not involve a transaction that
culminated in a foreclosure and deficiency judgment, it is instructive
in the author's opinion on what can be described as a fairly loose-knit
world of real estate appraisals in place when homes are being pur-
chased. In this daily atmosphere where an appraisal can somehow be
obtained to fit the purchase price, it is safe to say that the potential for
deficiency judgments is significant regardless of whether a transaction
is seller financed or financed in a conventional way through a third-
party lender.
Another recent case that provides insight into the contemporary
world of real property appraisal is Brown v. Roth,4 6 a case in which the
square footage estimate for the multiple listing form and initial
appraisal of the property was stated to be 3,484. The purchase price
paid by the buyer, and presumably the loan obtained by the buyer,
rested on the foundation of this appraisal. Two years later during a
refinancing transaction, the same house measured 3,108 square feet,
and this figure turned out to be the accurate one. While the home is
apparently complex in design, the difference in square footage is
significant.4 7
45. Id. at 383-384. The matter was before the Federal District Court on summary
judgment, and "the facts" were taken by Judge Bullock from the complaint, answers,
exhibits and depositions of the parties.
46. 133 N.C. App. 52, 514 S.E.2d 294 (1999).
47. Coincidentally, the author's home diminished in square footage and therefore
appraised value from the time of initial purchase to the time of refinancing. It is
suggested that builders might be using green wood that thereafter shrinks over a
period of time. In reality, it appears that the appraiser at the latter time was wearing
his conservative hat on behalf of the lender providing the refinancing. In a recent real
estate transaction, the appraiser thought that the sales price was $10,000 less than it
actually was. The appraisal came out identical to the mistaken amount. Upon being
informed of the actual price and the inadequacy of his appraisal, he responded that he
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A repeal of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.38 would not leave purchase
money mortgagors without a remedy. This is the case because anti-
deficiency protection exists in a different form under N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 45-21.36. This statute provides, in part:
It shall be competent and lawful for the defendant against whom such
deficiency judgment is sought to allege and show as matter of defense
and offset ... that the property sold was fairly worth the amount of the
debt secured by it at the time and place of sale or that the amount bid
was substantially less than its true value, and, upon such showing, to
defeat or offset any deficiency judgment against him, either in whole
or in part ... 48
In the most recent appellate court decision applying N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 45-21.36, First Citizens Bank & Trust Company v. Cannon,49 a
husband and wife obtained a mortgage loan in the principal amount of
$175,000 from the plaintiff bank. After default, the bank foreclosed
and was high bidder at the sale with a bid of $137,500. A deficiency
judgment of $29,406.21 resulted. Almost five months later, the bank
sold the property for $165,000. In the action for the deficiency, the
husband50 denied liability to the bank and pled in defense that the
property was worth the amount owed on it at the time of confirmation
of the foreclosure sale and that the bank's bid at the foreclosure sale
was substantially less than the true value of the property. 51 The trial
would perform a second appraisal. Of course, the second appraisal came out close to
the correct sales price for the property.
For yet another recent example of the wonderful world of appraisals, see Home
American Credit, Inc. v. Investors Title Ins. Co., 199 F.R.D. 563 (E.D.N.C. 2001), an
interesting case involving an imposter obtaining a $400,000 loan. At 199 F.R.D. 564,
Judge Howard notes: "The 'as is' value of the house if offered for resale at time of
default would have been approximately $300,000. The pre-sale appraisal of the
property listed its value at $550,000. The loan was for $400,000." Considering the
fact that the imposter/debtor defaulted on the first loan payment, the house made an
astronomical decline in value in a very short period of time.
48. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.36 (2000).
49. 138 N.C. App. 153, 530 S.E.2d 581 (2000).
50. The debtors, husband and wife, had obtained a mortgage loan while married.
They were divorced by the time of the action for a deficiency judgment. The ex-wife/
debtor made the legally fatal mistake of not filing an answer and the court of appeals
refused to set aside the default judgment against her that resulted.
51. The case also demonstrates how real estate appraisals can fluctuate. An
appraiser had appraised the property at $238,000 in May of 1994 when the
defendants refinanced the property and obtained a $175,000 loan from the plaintiff.
The same appraiser valued the home at $199,000 a little more than two years later.
The tax appraisals on the property valued it at $204,710. A realtor appraised the
property as of the date of foreclosure sale at a lower value, but this appraisal was
rejected by the court.
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court agreed with the debtor and the bank appealed. The court of
appeals affirmed.
Assuming the repeal of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.38 and a seller-
financed transaction with a scenario otherwise identical to First Citi-
zens Bank & Trust Co. v. Cannon, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.36 would be
available to protect a purchase-money mortgagor. Lender abuses of
debtors in seller-financed transactions, like lender abuses of debtors in
conventionally financed ones, can be addressed adequately by N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 45-21.36.52
While this goes beyond the focus of this article, it is appropriate to
add that if those in positions of policy-making were truly interested in
protecting the mortgagee in the event of default under a deed of trust,
the "notice of sale" drafted pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 45-21.16A
would include a "plain language" translation encouraging members of
the general public to look at the property and bid.5 3 I review notices of
sale printed each week in a county newspaper, and often one cannot
figure out what is being sold based on the metes and bounds descrip-
tion. Why not commence a foreclosure sale notice with something
helpful to the general public? Language something like: "a three-bed-
room home at 2341 Swamp Drive in Weeping Willow subdivision,
Buies Creek, will be sold at public sale on [date]. If you are interested
52. Respected experts would reform foreclosure law by extending anti-deficiency
legislation. See, e.g., John Mixon and Ira B. Shepard, Antideficiency Relief For Foreclosed
Homeowners: ULSIA Section 511(b), 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. 455 (1992).
53. There is a small but strong and growing "plain language" movement in the legal
profession. The Michigan Bar Journal has carried a "Plain Language" column for
many years. The column is edited by Professor Joseph Kimble of the Thomas Cooley
Law School. See, e.g., An Overview of the Plain English Movement For Lawyers ... Ten
Years Later, 71 Mich. BJ. 26 (January 1994). The State Bar of Michigan has a Plain
English Committee. The idea of a plain language foreclosure notice is not new. See
George Hathaway, Plain English In Real Estate Papers, 72 Mich. BJ. 1308, 1310 (Dec.
1993), where the author notes in part:
Joseph Backus, an attorney in Lansing, Michigan, wrote a plain English
mortgage foreclosure by advertisement, which we reprinted in the February
1990 Plain Language column. This foreclosure advertisement is a model of
clarity. It proves that real estate attorneys can do their job without
formalisms, archaic words, redundancies, and long sentences.., if they want
to.
See also Carol M. Bast, Lawyers Should Use Plain Language, 69 Fla. B.J. 30 (Oct. 1995):
The criticism of impenetrable legal writing is well founded, especially
concerning "functional documents." "Functional documents" are documents
such as contracts, jury instructions, and legislation written to be acted upon.
Legal documents, especially functional documents, should be written in
plain language because a reader cannot act on a document the reader cannot
understand. Id.
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in bidding at this sale and will need a loan in the event you are the
successful bidder, contact your lending institution for a loan applica-
tion. ' 54 The mortgage foreclosure sale process is obviously not user-
friendly from the perspective of the average member of the public, and
it is not designed to be.55
One might ask: "Just because the typical mortgagee in a conven-
tional third-party real estate loan is relatively unprotected in the event
of foreclosure is not a sound argument for eliminating the anti-defi-
ciency statute in seller-financed transactions." While there is merit to
this response, there is a factual reality in the contemporary seller-
financed real estate transaction that cannot be ignored. Unlike their
depression-era counterparts, most contemporary purchasers of real
estate are not in desperate straights and have the ability to obtain
financing by a number of distinct legal avenues. The potential for egre-
gious overreaching by sellers who are financing the buyer's purchase is
for all practical purposes insignificant. As will be discussed immedi-
ately below, the anti-deficiency statute is an relatively easy obstacle to
circumnavigate if the seller has bargaining power and an astute lawyer.
While the traditional installment land contract provides a format
for financing that is clearly a mortgage substitute, it is nonetheless
wholly outside of the scope of the anti-deficiency statute. Even though
it has a far greater potential for seller abuse, land contract financing
54. Subsection (3) of N.C. Gen. Stat. 45-21.16A, "Contents of notice of sale,"
requires that the notice of sale "Describe the real property to be sold in such a manner
as is reasonably calculated to inform the public as to what is being sold, which
description may be in general terms and may incorporate the description as used in
the instrument containing the power of sale by reference thereto." Clearly, this statute
authorizes a notice of sale that is written in plain language. There are no recent cases
dealing with the adequacy of the language in a notice under this statute. Older cases
deal with the language of the prior statute, which simply required that the description
in the deed of trust be repeated in the notice of sale. See, for example, Douglas v.
Rhodes, 188 N.C. 580, 125 S.E. 261 (1924) and Peedin v. Oliver, 222 N.C. 665, 24
S.E.2d 519 (1943).
55. There are a number of excellent articles dealing with the foreclosure process
and suggesting reform. See, e.g., Debra Pogrund Stark, Facing The Facts: An Empirical
Study Of The Fairness And Efficiency Of Foreclosures And A Proposal For Reform, 30 U.
Mich. J.L. Ref. 639 (1997); Reid Breitman, Equating California Foreclosure Sales With
Ordinary Residential Sales, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 947 (1995); Alex M. Johnson, Jr.,
Critiquing The Foreclosure Process: An Economic Approach Based On The Paradigmatic
Norms Of Bankruptcy, 79 Va. L. Rev. 959 (1993). Why not join the digital age and use
on-line auctions for foreclosure sales? See Jackie Spinner, Government, too, tries online
auctions, The News & Observer, July 9, 2001, at 3D (dealing with the sale of surplus
property by the federal government).
176 [Vol. 23:157
20
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol23/iss2/1
2001] LEGISLATIVE KUDZU AND THE NEW MILLENNIUM 177
remains completely unregulated.56 The equivalent of a deficiency
judgment can be achieved with relative ease by proper choice of rem-
edy in the event of a vendee's breach of a land contract.57 The land
contract has had a checkered history in many states, including North
Carolina. It has been legitimately used in the sale of vacation proper-
ties and in other situations where it is of mutual benefit to both vendor
and vendee to utilize this financing device, but it has also been used to
sell substandard properties to unsophisticated purchasers with low
incomes in situations where the opportunity for overreaching and
fraud is ripe.
The anti-deficiency statute can also be bypassed where a seller, in
addition to the usual documentation required for a seller-financed
purchase money mortgage transaction, also obtains an unsecured
promissory note. According to several appellate decisions, the statute
does not bar a holder's suit to enforce the unsecured note.58 Nor does
the statute bar the taking of additional property as security on a
56. By analogy, mortgage law has been applied in part to land contract law. See,
e.g., Lamberth v.McDaniel, 131 N.C. App. 319, 506 S.E.2d 295 (1998). In this case,
the court of appeals summarizes the relationship to mortgage law as follows:
"It has been held repeatedly that 'the relation between vendor and vendee in
an executory agreement for the sale and purchase of land is substantially that
subsisting between mortgagee and mortgagor, and governed by the same
general rules.'" Id. at 319, 506 S.E.2d at 296-97. Brannock v. Fletcher, 271
N.C. 65, 70-71, 155 S.E.2d 532, 539 (1967) (citations omitted); see also Boyd
v. Watts, 316 N.C. 622, 342 S.E.2d 840 (1986); In re Foreclosure of a Deed of
Trust and Taylor, 60 N.C. App. 134, 298 S.E.2d 163 (1982). "As between the
parties, the vendor may be considered a mortgagee and the vendee a
mortgagor." Brannock at 71, 155 S.E.2d at 539 (citations omitted). Upon
default, the vendor-mortgagees may choose a variety of remedies, including
forfeiture if the contract allows. Boyd v. Watts, 316 N.C. 622, 628, 342
S.E.2d 840, 843 (1986) ("The vendor, inter alia, may bring an action to quiet
title, accept the noncompliance as a forfeiture of the contract, or bring an
action to declare it at an end.")
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, of course, might also apply to overreaching in a land contract
fact situation.
57. Lamberth at 319, 506 S.E.2d at 295 (1998). The vendees do have the right if
they are able to prevent foreclosure by redeeming their interest by tendering the entire
balance due to the vendor plus interest.
58. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. SRW/Cary Assoc., 112 N.C. App. 846, 437 S.E.2d 3
(1993), ["The statute does not, however, act to bar an in personam action where the
promissory note is unsecured." Id. at 848, 437 S.E.2d at 4 (citing Brown v. Owens, 251
N.C. 348, 11 S.E.2d 705 (1959); Blanton v. Sisk, 70 N.C. App. 70, 318 S.E.2d 560
(1984)].
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purchase money loan and then foreclosing on the additional security
in addition to the purchase money security.5 9
C. The Perplexing Law of "Legal Access"
When asking practicing lawyers to identify a "number one" prob-
lem involving North Carolina real estate transactions, "legal access" is
a frequent response. Disagreements over legal access have increased
considerably in recent years for a number of reasons. An attitude of
good neighborliness that was the hallmark of earlier generations seems
to have dissipated. Real property values have increased dramatically,
and property owners are reluctant to give up any aspect of their bundle
of rights. Access is often sought in modern society for more than a
single-family homeplace on the back forty. At times, it can mean a new
subdivision or industrial park generating significant vehicular traffic
that most landowners would understandably prefer to see routed else-
where. Even where "legal access" exists, the nature and scope of that
access can be a subject of dispute. Can the access way be widened?
Can a speed bump be installed? Can a gate be placed on the right-of-
way? Can the way be paved?
Access is a particularly troublesome problem because the modern
transaction cost of pursuing a right to access can be prohibitive. 60
This is the case because access disputes may involve a painstaking
inquiry into the history of a property and the surrounding parcels, a
review of a plethora of appellate court decisions, attempts at applying
various common law theories of access (such as easements implied by
necessity or prior use), and, last but not least, two partially obsolete,
confusing and incomplete statutes: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-67, the
"Neighborhood public roads" statute, and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-69,
the "Cartway" statute. I will focus on the "Neighborhood public roads"
statute in this article and save a discussion of "cartways" for another
day.61 With transaction costs well out of proportion in many cases to
the right sought to be vindicated, the average citizen sometimes loses
his or her right to legal access. The game as important as it might be is
not worth the legal fees candle.
59. In re Foreclosure of Deed of Trust Executed by Fuller, 94 N.C. App. 207, 380
S.E.2d 120 (1989).
60. This is not a criticism of attorneys and the fees that must be charged to
adequately prepare for and pursue an access matter. Practicing attorneys would
welcome a clear set of rules governing access to real property.
61. It suffices to say that a statute authorizing freeholders "to lay off a cartway,
tramway, or railway.., or cableways, chutes, and flumes..." is probably in need of
substantial revision.
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One can only appreciate what an attorney handling an access dis-
pute might be faced with by reviewing the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 136-67. The first two paragraphs of the "Neighborhood public
roads" statute remind us of the wisdom of Chief Justice Holt in City of
London v. Wood when he wrote: "An Act of Parliament can do no
wrong, though it may do several things that look pretty odd. '62 Those
statutory paragraphs provide:
All those portions of the public road system of the State, which have
not been taken over and placed under maintenance or which have been
abandoned by the Department of Transportation, but which remain
open and in general use as a necessary means of ingress to and egress
from the dwelling house of one or more families, and all those roads
that have been laid out, constructed, or reconstructed with unemploy-
ment relief funds under the supervision of the Department of Health
and Human Services, and all other roads or streets or portions of roads
or streets whatsoever outside of the boundaries of any incorporated
city or town in the State, which serve a public use and as a means of
ingress or egress for one or more families, regardless of whether the
same have ever been a portion of any State or county road system, are
hereby declared to be neighborhood public roads and they shall be
subject to all of the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-68, 136-69 and
136-70 with respect to the alteration, extension, or discontinuance
thereof, and any interested party is authorized to institute such pro-
ceeding, and in lieu of personal service with respect to this class of
roads, notice by publication once a week in any newspaper published
in said county, or in the event there is no such newspaper, by posting
at the courthouse door and three other public places, shall be deemed
sufficient: Provided, that this definition of neighborhood public roads
shall not be construed to embrace any street, road or driveway that
serves an essentially private use, and all those portions and segments
of old roads, formerly a part of the public road system, which have not
been taken over and placed under maintenance and which have been
abandoned by the Department of Transportation and which do not
sever as a necessary means of ingress to and egress from an occupied
dwelling house are hereby excluded from the definition of neighbor-
hood public roads, and the owner of the land, burdened with such
portions and segments of such old roads, is hereby invested with the
easement or right-of-way for such old roads heretofore existing.
62. 88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1602 (K.B. 1701), cited at the beginning of Steve MacIsaac,
Common Sense About the Age of Statutes, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 754 (1983). See also J.
Stanley McQuade, Ancient Legal Maxims And Modern Human Rights, 18 Campbell L.
Rev. 75, 117 (1996) ("Misera est servitus ubi jus est vagum et incertum." "The law
performs miserably when it is vague and uncertain."
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Upon request of the board of county commissioners of any county, the
Department of Transportation is permitted, but is not required, to
place such neighborhood public roads as above defined in a passable
condition without incorporating the same into the State or county sys-
tem, and without becoming obligated in any manner for the permanent
maintenance thereof.
6 3
This statute reads like it was drafted via the cut-and-paste method.
While three types of roads qualify as neighborhood public roads, the
statute often poses more of an obstacle to establishing access than a
help. In one recent North Carolina Court of Appeals decision, for
example, the petitioners faced the practical difficulty of proving in the
year 1998 under one prong of the statute that the road in question
"was an established legal road by prescription in 1941."64 As the court
put it: "In other words, the relevant time period for proving the pre-
scriptive easement is twenty years prior to the enactment of the statute,
or from 1921 to 1941. ' 65
D. Eliminate Unnecessary Criminal Law Statutes
Civil statutes like the ones discussed above are not the only ones
that should be scheduled for oblivion. There also appear to be many
meaningless criminal law statutes on the books. Once again, I will
offer the real property law area to illustrate my point. Contemporary
American society is at times overwhelmed with serious crimes against
both persons and property. Statutes like N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-13, titled
"Wrongful surrender to other than landlord misdemeanor," occupy a
gnat-like level of importance in the relative scheme of things. That
statute reads:
Any tenant or lessee of lands who shall willfully, wrongfully and with
intent to defraud the landlord or lessor, give up the possession of the
rented or leased premises to any person other than his landlord or les-
sor, shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.
66
Assuming arguendo that widespread "wrongful surrender" was a
serious public policy issue at one time in North Carolina's history,6 7
the statute as drafted creates a misdemeanor that is nearly impossible
63. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-67.
64. Roten v. Critcher, 135 N.C. App. 469, 471, 521 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1999).
65. Id. at 473, 521 S.E.2d at 144. See also.Coghill v. Oxford Sporting Goods, Inc.,
2001 WL 503057 (N.C. App.).
66. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-13.
67. N.C. Gen. Stat. 42-13 was amended by the General Assembly in 1993, effective
October 1, 1994, so someone remained concerned about this issue into the 1990s.
Laws 1993, c. 539, § 402.
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to prove. How often will a tenant surrender the nonfreehold estate to
someone other than the landlord or lessor in a manner that was willful,
wrongful and with intent to defraud? The reality is that no district
attorney seriously considers adding "wrongful surrender" to a bur-
geoning caseload of violent and serious crimes. If a tenant indeed has
turned over the property to the wrong person, it is a civil matter, a
problem that most landlords are well equipped to efficiently deal with.
It makes no sense to pollute the statute books with laws like this one.
It ought to be repealed.68
Another example from the landlord and tenant area is N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 42-11, titled "Willful destruction by tenant misdemeanor."69
This statute serves no useful purpose, is duplicative of existing civil
law provisions, and is rarely if ever a basis for criminal prosecution.
Why continue it on the books?7
0
Another wonderful example of a law of questionable utility is N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 47-32.2,71 a statute that makes violation of the provisions
of other statutes related to the registration of a plat or map a misde-
meanor. It is puzzling why the second paragraph of this statute states
that the law does not apply to thirty-seven North Carolina counties.
72
In the history of this statute, has a single person been charged with the
misdemeanor of noncompliance with the other registration statutes?
Has a single person been convicted? Why is the statute on the books?
Why are 37% of North Carolina's counties excluded?73 This statute
68. Likewise, N.C. Gen. Stat. 42-11, "Willful destruction by tenant misdemeanor,"
seems an unnecessary duplication on a comprehensive set of criminal statutes in
North Carolina. As long as we are eliminating archaic, unused statutes, add N.C. Gen.
Stat. 42-22 ("Unlawful seizure by landlord or removal by tenant misdemeanor") to the
scrap heap.
69. The General Assembly amended this statute in 1993 and 1994. Laws 1993, c.
539, § 402; Laws 1994 (1st Ex. Sess.), c. 24, §14(c), eff. March 26, 1994.
70. As is typical of statutes in the landlord and tenant area, there is no counterpart
protection for tenants in the event a landlord destroys a tenant's property.
71. The statute is titled: "Violation of § 47-30 or § 47-32 a misdemeanor."
72. That paragraph reads:
The provisions of this section shall not apply to the following counties:
Alexander, Alleghany, Ashe, Beaufort, Camden, Clay, Franklin, Granville,
Greene, Harnett, Hertford, Hoke, Hyde, Jackson, Jones, Lee, Lincoln,
Madison, Martin, Northampton, Pamlico, Pasquotank, Pender, Person, Pitt,
Richmond, Robeson, Rockingham, Sampson, Scotland, Surry, Swain, Vance,
Warren, Washington, Watauga and Yadkin.
73. Most local variations of the North Carolina General Statutes are unnecessary in
the real property area. They unnecessarily complicate the law and convert North
Carolina into a series of de facto fiefdoms with unique customs and rules. There is
enough confusion in the uniform application of statutes.
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and most statutes like it should be repealed. They serve no function
other than to trivialize what should be the important role of legislation
in society.7 4
III. OTHER THOUGHTS AND CONSIDERATIONS ON LEGAL AND
LEGISLATIVE REFORM
A. The Transaction and Emotional Cost Of Obsolete And Ineffective
Statutes
At this juncture, I should define what I mean by "transaction
cost", because that term has triggered a volume of jurisprudential liter-
ature and economic theory centering on the Coase Theorem. 5 The
nuts and bolts of Coase's Theorem is that the framework of the law
that allocates rights in property is not of consequence as long as trans-
action costs are nil. According to this theorem, an efficient outcome
will result through the bargaining of the parties no matter who techni-
cally bears the burden of liability. One interpreter of the Coase Theo-
rem observed: "The conclusion may be drawn that the structure of the
law should be chosen so that the transaction costs are minimized,
because this will conserve resources used up by the bargaining process
and also promote efficient outcomes in the bargaining itself."76 Coase
notes that "economists, and policy-makers generally, have tended to
over-estimate the advantages which come from governmental
regulation.
' 77
74. At the 2001 session of the North Carolina General Assembly, yet another
unnecessary matter (one of many "local laws") was added to the books. House Bill
794, titled "An Act To Prohibit The Discharge Of A Fire Arm Across The Right-of-Way
Of A Public Road In Caldwell County For The Purpose Of Target Practice," was
enacted and is effective October 1, 2001. A violation of the act constitutes a Class 3
misdemeanor. Section 4 of the Act reads: "This act applies only to Caldwell County."
One can surmise that a good legal defense for a person charged with violating this
statute would be: "I wasn't aiming at anything." But wait, there's more from the 2001
session. Part of an extensive and reasonable piece of legislation titled "An Act To
Amend The Embalmers And Funeral Directors Law Of North Carolina" includes the
following sentence worthy of material for the Jay Leno show: "No person shall use
profanity, indecent, or obscene language in the presence of a dead human body."
2001 Session Laws 2001-294 (H.B. 440). See A.C. Snow, We 'might could' pass a much
better law, The News & Observer, July 29 2001, at 2B, (calling this law "without a
doubt, the silliest law our legislature will have passed this session.")
75. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
76. Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. Legal Stud. 1, 14 (1982).
77. See Coase supra note 74. Coase continues: "But this belief, even if justified,
does not do more than suggest that government regulation should be curtailed. It
does not tell us where the boundary line should be drawn. This, it seems to me, has to
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It is not my intention here to re-plow the well-cultivated furrows of
the law-and-economics/jurisprudence realm. Perhaps I should select a
different descriptive term for purposes of emphasizing my point. Let's
be practical and simply call it the "dispute price-tag." One commenta-
tor's term, "entitlement-determination coStS," 7 8 also describes with
more eloquence and precision what I am concerned about. I should
also add that the economic aspect of a real property dispute (or most
disputes for that matter) can be over-emphasized. There is a personal
and emotional "price-tag" that attaches to legal disputes that most
commentators ignore. One author writing about disputes in a differ-
ent area of law observed:
[L]itigation has a great deal in common with major surgery. Both are
extremely unsettling in prospect, painful, prolonged, embarrassing,
disruptive and inordinately expensive in execution, and somewhat
unpredictable as to outcome. Each requires that the victim entrust
matters of the most vital personal concern into the hands of a profes-
sional champion, who is not always regarded as being equal to the
challenge of this monumental responsibility, even granting his or her
sincerity and single-minded dedication to the case.79
When the law is so obsolete and confused and the dispute price
tag becomes greatly disproportionate to the value of the property right
in dispute, what will happen? Who is favored? If A and B are engaged
in a legal dispute concerning whether A has a common law or statu-
tory right to an easement over B's land, what is the effect of the combi-
nation of confusing laws and the high cost of legal representation?
The following example, based upon a fact situation with which I am
personally familiar, might be helpful in assessing those questions.
Example. A purchases part of an old farm, a ten-acre parcel of
land with a small farm house located to the rear of the parcel. The
parcel has 360 feet of frontage on a state road located approximately
400 feet from the house at the front of the parcel, but the historic and
far more convenient public road access to the farm house has been
come from a detailed investigation of the actual results of handling the problems in
different ways..."
78. Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property
Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. [somewhere between pp. 13-26 or 35-48]. Merrill observes:
"Entitlement-determination costs, in contrast to transaction costs, are the resources
that must be expended in order to establish who has the property right that is the
subject of the exchange." He defines "transaction costs" as consisting "of the resources
that must be expended in order to enter into and enforce contracts for the exchange or
modification of property rights."
79. Aiken, Adams & Hall, Legal Liabilities In Higher Education: Their Scope and
Management (National Association of College and University Attorneys 1976).
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over an unpaved driveway located in part over a thirty-foot strip along
the western edge of the adjoining one-acre parcel owned by B. No doc-
ument in the recent chain of title exists that expressly creates an ease-
ment over that strip. The attorney handling the closing for A correctly
noted in the title report that the parcel had legal access. After purchas-
ing the property, A accessed the farm house by traveling over the drive-
way for several months until B sold the adjoining parcel to C. C now
objects to any use of the driveway by A. C explains that A should "use
his own land" to gain access.
The central question in this example is not so much what the law
is concerning legal access. Rather, it is how the dispute will progress
and be shaped and resolved at the grass roots level in light of two fac-
tors: the confusing state of the law of access when it is applied to con-
crete fact situations and the relatively dear cost of employing a legal
champion to negotiate the dispute and, if necessary, attempt to vindi-
cate the rights of each party. While any number of scenarios can be
envisioned, the path of this dispute (no pun intended) went through
the following steps:
Step One: A and C exchanged several phone calls. C threatened to
block the driveway and warned A that he better build his own driveway
and access the state road over his own property. C pointed out that A
had ten acres at his disposal, while C's parcel was only one acre in
area. Why should C give up part of his property ownership?
Step Two: Because of what he perceived as the high cost of retain-
ing an attorney, A went the often unreliable "free advice" route by
checking with a fellow church member and lawyer just before Sunday
school. A also jumped on America Online and found all kinds of infor-
mation on the general law of easements from all over the nation. A
also read a chapter in a book intended to be used by real estate agents
to add to his knowledge of "the law."
Step Three: C, true to his word, blocked the driveway by plowing
up portions of it and placing a locked gate at the entrance from the
public road.
Step Four: A phoned the attorney who handled the closing. The
attorney told him not to worry and drafted an excellent "legal" letter to
C informing C that A claimed an easement right over the driveway on
C's land.
Step Five: C retained an attorney, who responded with a letter
denying the existence of any legal right-of-way benefiting A over C's
land.
Step Six: A made another appointment with his attorney. At this
meeting, the attorney explained that title insurance did not cover the
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matter because the road frontage gave A legal access.8 ° Therefore, if A
wanted to continue to use the driveway over C's land, A would have to
prove that he had some kind of valid easement, and that could be
expensive. Since no expressly created easement was found in the
recent title records to which the most recent title search was limited,
the land records would need to be searched much further back in time.
The records would also have to be searched to determine whether
some type of implied easement might have been created. The possibil-
ity of a prescriptive easement was also mentioned, as was a general
reference to the possibility that A might have a "neighborhood public
road." The attorney would also need to look into the General Statute
books to ascertain whether A's fact situation qualified A for legal
access under any statutory provision. A's attorney asked for a $2500
retainer and informed A that his hourly rate was $150/hour and that
he had no idea how many hours this matter might take. When asked
to guess, A's attorney offered a price tag of $5,000 to $10,000 to possi-
bly clear up this matter, but wisely made no guarantees.
Step Seven: A told his attorney "that he would think about it" and
made an appointment with another attorney.
Step Eight: Repeat in general terms with some variation in advice
and legal fee steps six and seven.
Step Nine: A called a local contractor, had a new driveway bull-
dozed in from the main road over A's road frontage and had numerous
loads of crush-and-run delivered and spread at a total cost of $4,000.
Step Ten: A is bitter about the dispute, has nothing to do with his
neighbor, and harbors an intense dislike for the legal system and law-
yers in general.
From one perspective, the above scenario demonstrates the deep
chasm that exists between the theoretical realm of the law so revered in
most law schools and the practical reality of what often takes place in
real life fact situations. It and thousands of unreported daily scenarios
like it demonstrate the irrelevance of "the law" of the statute books and
appellate court decisions to a majority of citizens who simply cannot
afford to engage in a dispute with proper legal representation.
There is no cost-effective way for the typical citizen, not to men-
tion the citizen at the poverty level, to adequately enforce even the
most basic of statutory property rights. As such, they have ceased to
be "rights" in any realistic definition of that concept and instead
appear to be mere facades or legislative statements without practical
80. Sometimes the "dispute price tag" will be covered by title insurance. The
increasing cost of resolving legal disputes renders the "duty to defend" aspect of title
insurance a practical and valuable benefit to the insured.
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meaning, at least to the average citizen. To the extent that this observa-
tion is accurate, there has been a de facto disintegration of the institu-
tion of private property. For example, imagine that a farmer calls with
a problem similar in practical effect to the one summarized above: a
neighboring farmer and his son went out to one common boundary
and moved a ditch and fence line several feet over. The land is optimis-
tically valued at $2500 per acre, and the value of the lost property is
about $4,000. No recent survey of the property exists. Unless the
offending neighbor caves in upon receipt of one nasty letter from the
innocent farmer's attorney, it will cost the farmer more than the value
of the lost land to restore it. This, in turn, encourages the innocent
farmer to resort to self-help to restore his line. The sanctity of bounda-
ries is an ancient concept,81 and the ancient law had its own alterna-
tive dispute resolution techniques.82
B. A Tradition of "Top-Down" Evaluation and Reform
The legal profession has an understandable tradition of engaging
in a "top-down" evaluation of policy issues, including the evaluation of
existing and proposed statutes. In this "top-down" approach, the pro-
fession looks to appellate court decisions, the writings of law profes-
sors, the work of law reform groups, special committees, and bar
sections. The question is: What does each source of "top-down" evalu-
ation actually contribute to any meaningful assessment of a statute?
Appellate court decisions, almost worshiped in law school and in
the journals and newsletters of the profession, are really sources of
statutory interpretation rather than evaluation. With roots in the polit-
ical process, appellate judges are circumspect when it comes to dis-
cussing the need for or effectiveness of a statute. Members of the legal
profession periodically gather at continuing legal education and
related functions to read and hear summaries of what the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of North Carolina have to
say about the meaning or effect of a given statute. Because these are
the "appellate" or "high" courts, every opinion is dissected by some
expert in order to assist in predicting how future matters might be
interpreted. Because appellate courts can only react to the fact situa-
tions presented to them in the record on appeal, they carry serious
limitations as a method of statutory evaluation. They often amount to
81. Among the references in Proverbs, see Proverbs 22:28 ("Do not move an
ancient boundary stone set up by your forefathers"), and Proverbs 23:10 ("Do not
move the ancient boundary stone or encroach on the fields of the fatherless").
82. One Old Testament method was "casting the lot," a procedure that might be
considered in some disputes today. Proverbs 17:18.
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nothing more than highly informed improvisations to solve existing
disputes in society. They are emphasized in law schools because they
constitute convenient and often interesting starting points for legal
analysis and policy considerations, but frankly they do not deserve the
emphasis that the profession and the legal academy accords them. In
some respects, the disproportionate emphasis lavished on appellate
decisions diverts attention from a more difficult, thorough, scientific
analysis of the true meaning and effect of a statute.
The writings of law professors constitute another "top-down"
method of evaluation. Law professors (including this one) love to eval-
uate statutes and suggest reform. The perspective of members of the
academy is certainly an important one, but, like appellate decisions,
they provide but one perspective of a matter-often a purely theoretical
snapshot. Law review articles have value, of course, but they are
undermined by a number of factors.83 First, the stark reality is that
the majority of contemporary law professors have never practiced law
in any meaningful fashion.84 Others, of course, practiced so long ago
that the entire process now constitutes a distant dream. Too many, by
the way, not only have never practiced law, but also exhibit a disdain
for the practice. Theory is wonderful, but an appreciation of the nuts
and bolts of the daily practice of law, of what it means to require a
retainer from a client, of the mundane realities of overhead, postage,
computer equipment, advertising, and law office management in gen-
eral are seldom a foundational element in scholarly writing. Apprecia-
tion of what really goes on in the trenches is essential for an observer
to be complete in assessing the effectiveness of an existing or proposed
83. For a good recent discussion of the relevance of legal scholarship to the
judiciary, see Judge Alex Kozinski, Who Gives A Hoot About Legal Scholarship? 37 Hous.
L. Rev. 295 (2000). Judge Kozinski has a number of astute observations on the
relationship between judges and academics. One of his conclusions is that legal
scholarship does matter, but it could matter more.
84. Judge Kozinski observes:
Finally, and most radically perhaps, maybe we should give a little more
thought about who becomes an academic. One way to make academic
scholarship more useful to the judiciary is to have academics who are more
attuned to the practical aspects of lawyering and judging. But it's difficult to
have a sense of the practical without some practical experience. Someone
who becomes an academic directly out of law school-or perhaps after one or
two years of clerking-may not be in the best position to identify topics that
have practical significance or to come up with practical solutions to the
problems they do tackle. I therefore propose that law schools adopt a
standard policy that no one will be invited to be a faculty member without at
least three years of nonacademic, post-graduate experience.
37 Hous. L. Rev. at 320.
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statute. Second, there is the unfortunate tendency of law professors to
talk down to the profession, discussing policy issues as if professors
are the ultimate source of wisdom in the evolution of the law through
the ages. Theory combined with arrogance is neither well received nor
effective with the practicing bar. Law professors have much to contrib-
ute to the process of statutory evaluation, but no less important is the
input of the daily users of the law. These daily users or "consumers"
of the law are the clients and their attorneys.
Continuing legal education speakers prepare manuscripts, often
quoting statutes and appellate court decisions, and then perform a
"talking-head" presentation, sometimes with Microsoft PowerPoint or
other visual aids, at the many CLE programs held throughout this state
and the nation. Many CLE speakers are practicing lawyers, so these
programs should in theory constitute effective opportunities for statu-
tory evaluation and reform. While continuing education presentations
and manuscripts offer an important addition to any dialogue related to
statutory evaluation and reform, they also represent a "top-down" form
of evaluation because the potential of the audience and the practical
wisdom and insights that members might offer remain largely untap-
ped. 5 As noted above, CLE programs are too often preoccupied with
recent appellate decisions, as if there is nothing else for a group of
lawyers to talk about. Continuing education program speakers work
hard and are volunteers, and this discussion is not intended to offend
them. However, the CLE process itself cries for reinvention, and there
is much going on by way of creative experimentation. Suggestions for
reinvigorating CLE include making use of more organized methods of
getting the audience involved as partners in the process. Input from
those enrolled in a program received in advance of the presentation
and manuscript preparation would be helpful. Instant feedback
through electronic devices at each seat in the audience would be won-
85. In a recent ABA Journal article dealing with examples of the legal process
becoming more friendly to pro se litigants, the following observations appear at end of
the article:
At a recent conference in Massachusetts on pre se litigants, Mary K. Ryan, a
Boston lawyer who chairs the ABA legal services delivery committee, was
impressed most by the differences between theory and reality in the
presentations. "It was really striking that on the first day people were
speaking from on high, and the second day we heard from people who work
in the courts, who weren't prepared to debate what the bar should do but
instead spoke of what they were already doing," she says. "If you work in the
court-clerk staff, interpreter, law librarian-you have a lot of people coming
to you every day, and you want to be able to do something for them."
Terry Carter, Self-Help Speeds Up, 87 A.B.AJ. 34, 38 (July 2001).
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derful. The technique used at some meetings of breaking into small
groups, working on issues and problems, and then reporting back to
the entire assembly works well if carefully planned in advance. It goes
without saying that computer technology, Web pages, and e-mail
should foster a more broad-based approach to continuing legal educa-
tion. Some continuing legal education programs could also benefit
from a work product, a brief (and I stress "brief') report by way of
electronic or conventional newsletter concerning matters of concern to
both speakers and members of the audience.
"Top-down" evaluation of statutes and proposed legislation also
has a source in the work of specialized sections of both state and
national bar associations. Again, this is not to suggest that specialized
sections are not making valuable contributions to the process; rather,
it is again to emphasize that, somewhat surprisingly, the sections do
not always speak for the rank-and-file members of the practicing bar.
Additionally, sections are sometimes overpopulated by attorneys repre-
senting clients who dominate a field-lenders, for example, in the real
property area-and these attorneys do not always take an altruistic
approach to statutory evaluation.
The work of law reform committees and organizations, both on a
state and national level, constitute yet another form of "top-down" eval-
uation. These committees, commissions, and institutes provide leader-
ship and a perspective on current and proposed statutes, but they
invariably approach the process with prejudices and preconceived
notions of what is good for the legal profession and society. One
highly regarded preconceived notion is that the law on any given topic
ought to be "uniform" throughout the nation. Critics can argue that
uniformity is not always in the best overall interests of the practicing
bar or of the public in general. Uniform laws tend to be well drafted,
but the Code Justinian approach to covering every conceivable possi-
bility fails because all statutes raise new issues of interpretation.
Clearing up one set of problems or ambiguities by statutory revision or
the addition of new statutes inescapably results in new problems and
ambiguities.
If the history of the ongoing development of the law is any guide,
"top-down" evaluation will continue to be the dominant approach.
This predictable state of affairs is largely due to the complacency of
members of the rank-and-file practicing bar, including local bar
associations. The current players in the realm of statutory evaluation
and reform are there in part because of the vacuum-some would say
the "black hole"-created by a lack of interest and effective participa-
tion by most members of the bar. These busy but apathetic soldiers of
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the law appear more than willing to be led from on high. They have
apparently abdicated their professional responsibility to continue to
monitor and improve the legal system.
Last but not least, "top-down" evaluation too often fails to seek
input from the day-to-day consumers of legal services. The "con-
sumer" -as opposed to consumer and special interest groups-is
rarely a part of any ongoing processes of statutory assessment. What
does the "consumer" of legal services and statutes want? Consumer
input should constitute an important addition to the process by which
laws are evaluated and enacted. A focus on effective, user-friendly
laws, citizen-based laws rather than laws for experts or lawyers, needs
to be added to the framework for statutory analysis.
C. Disproportionate Reliance on Secondary Interpretation
While the following statement is overly simplistic, "the law" can
be said to exist on two levels: there are primary sources of law, and
then there are secondary interpretations of those sources. While I
have a very favorable impression of the current generation of law stu-
dents, an example based upon my observation of some of them may
prove helpful. It strikes me that the last thing that some students com-
ing through the American education system want is to focus on the
primary source. If the language of a statute proves tricky or difficult,
the student will seek out a study aid. Instead of trying to confront the
meaning of a law at the primary source level, the student seeks a
crutch, something to tell him or her what to think. A problematic
court of appeals or supreme court decision that would make perfect
sense if read two or three times with facts diagramed to assist in analy-
sis will not be read two or three times. Indeed, the entire decision
might not be carefully read once. Rather, the student will seek an
interpretation of the primary source. What does somebody else say it
says? If that makes sense or is at least comfortable, then the student's
analysis is done.
Law students eventually become lawyers-at least most of them
do. The comfort level and satisfaction with what others say the law is
continues. Instead of reading and re-reading a new statute passed by
the General Assembly, too many lawyers rely on newsletters and
"experts" to tell them what the statute means and what to think about
it. The problem with this approach is that "precedent" starts to
become the interpretation of others rather than the language of the
primary source. There is value in what experts and those with back-
ground in the law have to share with the practicing bar, but there is
also much value in a first-hand look at the primary sources of law.
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D. Evaluation in the Digital Millennium
One avenue that needs to be explored is the utilization of com-
puter technology to assist in statutory evaluation. Except for appellate
court decisions and a happenstance system of "top-down" statutory
evaluation, discussed above, there is no organized system in place to
take advantage of the ongoing revolution in electronic communica-
tions and computerized information processing. The collection and
integration of data concerning litigation and the filing of public docu-
ments would provide an entirely different analysis approach.16 At pre-
sent, the organized bar and state and local government units are not
coming close to making effective use of computing resources to
improve the system of laws and justice in North Carolina.
To assist in the proper study of the effect of a given statute or
specific statutory language, attorneys and legislators must have a sci-
entific method of evaluation and measurement. Technology can easily
provide data from the "practicing law" level rather than just the appel-
late level of the legal system. It can be organized and integrated to
assist in the process of statutory analysis. The data flow from county
seats around the state can be placed in utilitarian and easily accessible
databases. Technology can also be used to simulate and model the
effect of statutory language on transactions and disputes. Representa-
tive simulations of legal disputes can be designed by analyzing existing
data filed in public offices.
Computer technology can also be a resource to assist in the evalu-
ation of proposed legislation. Through computer technology, we can
envision likely scenarios of problems and disputes in light of the legis-
lative proposal. What will people actually do if the new statute is
passed? What legal arguments will their lawyers make? Will the new
law be an expensive one in terms of the transaction cost of a dispute
subject to the law? In plain English, will the typical client be able to
afford justice under the proposed statute? Is there a more cost-effective
alternative to the statute as proposed? What ambiguities in the law
86. For example, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-6, titled "Revocation of deeds of future
interests made to persons no in esse," with its three provisos, has not been the subject
of an appellate decision since the 1940s and has, like so many statutes, generated its
own curative act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-6.1 ("Validation of deeds of revocation of
conveyances of future interests to persons not in esse"). Does N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-6
have utility for the practicing bar? Is it used? How often? Effective use of computer
technology at the courthouse level would reveal telling things about some of the
statutes mentioned earlier in the "hit-list" portion of this article. To cite another
example, in calendar year 2000, how many spouses asserted a right to the one-third
life interest under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 29-30?
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will lawyers exploit? Is the "problem" that prompted the proposal of
new legislation really a widespread problem throughout the state?
How is the "problem" now being handled in the absence of a statute or
pursuant to an existing statute? Is the statute really necessary?
There is room in the framework for analysis to consider creative
approaches to how laws actually affect people. 7 In a recent article
summarizing the "behavioral law and economics" perspective, the edi-
tors of the Green Bag ask basic questions: "How does law actually
affect people? What do people do in response to the law? Why is the
law as it is? How can law be enlisted to improve people's lives? What
do people like, and what are they like?"88 Professor Sunstein writes:
In the last two decades, social scientists have learned a lot about how
people actually make decisions. Much of this work requires qualifica-
tions of rational choice models, which have dominated the social sci-
ences, including the economic analysis of law. Those models are often
wrong in the simple sense that they give inaccurate predictions about
what people will actually do. People are not always "rational" in the
sense that economists suppose. But it does not follow that people's
behavior is unpredictable, systematically irrational, random, rule-free,
or elusive to social scientists. On the contrary, the qualifications can
be described, used, and sometimes even modeled. We know, for exam-
ple, that people dislike losses, even more than they like gains; that they
are averse to extremes; that they have a difficult time in translating
many harms into dollar amounts; that they care about fairness, like to
be fair, and are willing to punish unfairness; that they tend to be
unrealistically optimistic; that their own moral judgments are self-serv-
ing; and that they rely on heuristics, or rules of thumb, that can lead to
systematic errors.8 9
My suggestion is that, in addition to traditional "top-down" meth-
ods of statutory evaluation, the organized bar consider additional per-
spectives on how laws are interpreted and applied in the real world.
My thought is that an organized approach utilizing the benefits of com-
puter technology will allow evaluators to gain exciting insights into
how statutes operate and how our whole system of justice works or
does not work. Private corporations have engaged in market research
at the grass roots consumer level for decades. Government, legal schol-
ars and the organized bar should also embrace this approach.
87. See Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics (Cambridge University
Press 2000). See also Symposium, The Legal Implications of Psychology, Human
Behavior, Behavioral Economics and the Law, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1499 (1998).
88. Cass R. Sunstein, Economics & Real People, 3 Green Bag 397 (2000).
89. Id. at 397-398.
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One component of monitoring statutory use at the local level
should include scientifically designed surveys to be voluntarily com-
pleted by both practicing attorneys and members of the public. These
surveys could be on-line. Considering input from members of the pub-
lic who are participants in some way in the legal system-a citizen
driven focus in addition to the traditional lobbyist and special interest
group driven focus-will provide yet another perspective on how laws
really operate and affect humanity.
Web pages and e-mail are now being utilized to communicate pro-
posed legislation to interested lawyers. Individual recipients of this
information and local bar associations have an obligation to the pro-
fession and to the jurisprudence of this state to take an active role in
responding to this information.
E. The Concept of Desuetude
Might a statute be judicially abrogated when it has fallen into dis-
use for a long period of time? The theory is that the ignored statute no
longer reflects the goals and values of the community. 90 Desuetude
most often surfaces as a criminal law/constitutional law defense to
criminal law statutes that have long gone ignored and unenforced. 91
While the idea that a statute may be declared void for desuetude has
with a few exceptions been generally rejected in the United States, it is
my view that numerous civil law statutes, and those statutes affecting
real property law in particular, can be considered void for desuetude
in a practical, day-to-day practice of law meaning of that concept. As
emphasized above, the incompleteness of most law review articles is
that, for the most part, they analyze appellate court decisions to dis-
cern policy and law. This ignores what goes on in the proverbial
90. See David B. Cruz, "The Sexual Freedom Cases"? Contraception, Abortion,
Abstinence, and the Constitution, 35 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 299, 334 ("Under the
doctrine of desuetude, which generally has not been adopted in the United States,
'courts may abrogate statutes that have fallen into disuse.' Generally speaking, 'the
doctrine of desuetude refers to judicial abrogation of a statute that has not been
enforced for a long period of time, no longer reflects the goals and values of the
community, and is thus widely ignored."'). At footnote 197, the author refers to an
article in the New York Times by William Safire titled "The Penumbra of Desuetude,"
in which Safire quotes Judge Bork's analysis of the statute invalidated in Griswold as
stating: "'I think you'd have a great argument of no fair warning, or sometimes what
lawyers call ... desuetude, meaning it's just so out of date it's gone into limbo."' Id. at
n. 127 (quoting The Penumbra of Desuetude, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1987, at 16, 18.
91. See,e.g., United States v. Elliot, 266 F. Supp. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), cited and
summarized by Dhananjai Shivakumar, The Pure Theory As Ideal Type: Defending
Kelsen On The Basis Of Weberian Methodology, 105 Yale LJ. 1383, 1905 n. 85 (1996).
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trenches. If, for example, lawyers involved in disputes over real prop-
erty issues consistently ignore a statute that might have applicability to
the dispute, and if trial judges consistently steer clear of certain stat-
utes because they consider them archaic or hopelessly confusing and
the cause of more problems than they purport to solve, then a de facto
desuetude has taken place in a very substantial way. A statute that is
uniformly ignored by practicing lawyers, trial court judges, and clerks
of court undergoes atrophy almost as effective as legislative repeal.
Once again, I make my case for utilizing computer technology and
"e-feedback" to provide evidence of de facto desuetude. The resources
of the computer should be utilized to ascertain those statutes in the
real property area (and certainly in all areas of civil and criminal law)
that are consistently ignored at the grassroots level of the practice of
law. Unused statutes should then be analyzed by a review board that
includes general practitioners and trial court judges in addition to
leading experts in the field.92
F. Challenges Facing the New Millennium Law Student
The prolific expansion and increase in complexity of statutory law
combined with the arrival of the Internet and all of the capabilities of
computer technology in recent decades have resulted in significant
challenges to teaching and learning the law within the traditional
three-year law school curriculum. During more than a decade of serv-
ing as a law school dean,9 3 1 experienced what I considered unfair and
inaccurate observations by some members of the practicing bar along
the following lines: "today's law students have it too easy", "a third of
my law school class didn't make it, but nobody flunks out anymore",
"the quality of law students is not what it used to be", "the current
generation of law students is composed of weak writers", and "law
professors today are first-class wimps... nowhere near as tough as old
Professor was back at good old School of
Law. 94
92. The North Carolina General Statutes Commission provides an excellent
existing entity for this systematic, periodic statutory review.
93. Years as a law school dean are somewhat akin to so-called "dog years": each
year in fact represents seven years of a regular human being's life. Therefore, I was
dean in "dean-years" for more than seventy years. But I digress.
94. For more than a decade, I have received feedback like this on literally hundreds
of occasions. The reader is invited to fill in the name of the ornery old law professor
(whose sheer meanness and intimidating demeanor seems to increase in intensity as
the years since law school graduation allow memory embellishment to set in) and law
school alma mater (which is not what it used to be).
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In response, I asserted and continue to assert that the current gen-
eration of law students is faced with attempting to comprehend a body
of federal and state law that is significantly more complex and volumi-
nous than the now relatively quaint law school curricula of three
decades ago. Let's use the basic real property law subjects by way of
example. I have selected the basic, first-year real property courses as
an example solely because of my long-time familiarity with them.
What might a basic Property I course cover in the year 2001? What
about Property II? How do these courses compare with the Property I
and II courses of my student days?9"
Let's start with the "basic" Property I course in the year 2001.
Like those who suffered before, the student of the new millennium
must grapple with estates in land and future interests. The capstone
experience in this regard is the infamous common law Rule Against
Perpetuities, that deceptively simple "lives in being plus twenty-one
years" cruel invention of the common law that has spawned centuries
of labyrinthine bewilderment in its application to even simple fact situ-
ations.96 One would have hoped and indeed prayed that reform would
have completely obliterated that rule, at least prospectively. Unfortu-
nately, the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities and compan-
ion legislation recently enacted in North Carolina require that a law
student (and lawyer) continue to understand the common law rule and
actually complicate the area of estates in land and future interests by
continuing to emphasize a distinction between contingent remainders
and executory interests. Whatever the reader thinks of the reform, my
point is simple: law students must now deal with a statutory overlay.
There is significantly more to learn, and the statutory reform has not
simplified the area from the standpoint of a law student's attempt to
study and comprehend to the extent possible the entire perpetuities
conundrum.
When that first-year law student moves on to what was once the
somewhat quaint law of landlord and tenant, she or he is confronted
with a volume of the General Statutes abounding with so-called reform
legislation affecting residential tenancies. 97 The centerpiece reform,
95. My law school graduation date was 1971. I was a student in Property I and II
in 1968.
96. At Campbell's law school, students are introduced to the Rule Against
Perpetuities in Property I and then study it in greater detail in the second year Wills
course. Those who opt for the Estate Planning Seminar will once again confront the
monster.
97. "So-called" because many of these reforms favoring the residential tenant
provide little to the tenant in terms of meaningful remedies and attorney fees. But for
a judicial gloss favoring tenants under some of the statutes and but for the ubiquitous
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the Residential Rental Agreements Act,9" produces an entirely new and
somewhat comprehensive set of issues. (Indeed, every new statute,
regardless of the skill of the drafter, is capable of producing numerous
new issues of statutory interpretation.) Students must also deal with
statutes aimed at prohibiting retaliatory eviction, 99 the Tenant Security
Deposit Act,' 00 statutes prohibiting self-help eviction, 1 1 special stat-
utes dealing with the treatment by the landlord of the residential ten-
ant's personal property, 102 statutes dealing with condominium
conversions of residential units, 10 3 statutes addressing public housing
fact situations,'0 4 laws addressing lead-based paint hazards, 10 5 and
last but not least, federal and state laws addressing housing discrimi-
nation. 10 6 One cannot study landlord and tenant law in a state famous
for its resort properties without paying homage to the Vacation Rental
Act.' 0 7 As with every area of substantive law, discussion of the law of
landlord and tenant law must now also address technology issues.'08
With landlord and tenant law out of the way, the first semester
law student moves on to the law of concurrent ownership. Here, she
or he is faced in North Carolina with the resurrection of the joint ten-
ancy form of concurrent ownership. 10 9 In addition, one cannot ade-
Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, these residential
tenant statutes would amount to little more than wonderful statements of theoretical
public policy.
98. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-38 et seq. (2000).
99. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-37.1 et seq. (2000). Not a single case at the appellate level
exists interpreting these statutes. Once again, the remedies provided for are at best
weak from the tenant's perspective.
100. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-50 et seq. (2000). At the risk of sounding like a broken
record (or compact disc), these statutes do little to curb widespread abuse by
residential landlords in the area of tenant security deposits. Once again, the remedies
provisions render this an impotent reform. The tenant's only real hope is invoking
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1.
101. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-25.6 - 42-25.9 (2000).
102. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-25.7 (2000).
103. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47A-34 - 47A-37 (2000).
104. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 157-29 (2000).
105. See, e.g., the Residential Lead-Based Hazard Reduction Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4851 et seq. (1995).
106. The State Fair Housing Act is codified as Chapter 41A of the North Carolina
General Statutes. The federal law can be found at 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. A myriad
of appellate decisions and administrative regulations exist interpreting these laws.
107. Chapter 42A of the North Carolina General Statutes.
108. Consider, for example, the following CLE program announcement from the
Practising Law Institute®: "Telecom Real Estate Strategies. How to Lease & Develop
the 'Smart Building' in the Dot-Com Age." PLI News, Vol. 38, No. 48, April 20, 2001.
109. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41-2 (2000).
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quately deal with concurrent ownership without some cross-reference
to the implications of the law of Equitable Distribution. 110
The final subject of the first semester property law course is
another nightmare in terms of the common law: the law of non-posses-
sory interests in land. This includes the relatively fun areas of ease-
ments and profits, but even this area now has important statutory
aspects in the form of laws authorizing conservation and historic pres-
ervation easements."1  The "rails-to-trails" 112 movement also adds
somewhat complex statutory and regulatory law to the formerly
quaint law of easements. Once the student moves on to the common
law thicket of covenants at law and equitable restrictions, 1 3 she or he
must now grapple with the comprehensive Planned Community Act,
legislation that covers an entire chapter of the General Statutes. 1 14
This is the case because restrictions in planned communities can be
enforced by virtue of statutory authority. It should be always stressed
during this discussion that statutory additions to the law of the land
rarely eliminate the preexisting common law, especially in the area of
real property. Hence new millennium students must learn every bit of
the common law that has always been a part of legal education" 5 and,
in addition, digest an ever-increasing amount of statutory law and
interpretations of that law. Finally, it is not possible to adequately
cover private rules that govern property ownership without some
acknowledgment in class of the existence of the comprehensive North
110. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20 et seq. (2000).
111. See, e.g., the North Carolina Historic Preservation and Conservation
Agreements Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 121-34 et seq. (2000).
112. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C.A. § 1247, the "National Trails System"; Jeffrey Alan Bandini,
The Acquisition, Abandonment, And Preservation Of Rail Corridors In North America: A
Historical Review And Contemporary Analysis, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 1989 (1997); Danaya C.
Wright & Jeffrey Hester, Pipes, Wires, and Bicycles: Rails-To-Trails, Utility Easements,
And The Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements From the Nineteenth To The Twenty-First
Centuries, 27 Ecology L.Q. 351 (2000).
113. See, e.g., Runyon v. Paley, 331 N.C. 293, 416 S.E.2d 177 (1992), the leading
case nationally summarizing the enforceability of covenants at law and restrictions in
equity. Justice Meyer's opinion is a masterpiece, and all first-year law students should
study it.
114. Chapter 47F of the North Carolina General Statutes. Key provisions of the Act
apply retroactively to planned communities created before the January 1, 1999
effective date of the Act. See, Patrick K. Hetrick, Of "Private Governments" And The
Regulations Of Neighborhoods: The North Carolina Planned Community Act, 22 Campbell
Law Review 1 (1999).
115. The common law itself continues to burgeon as the advance sheets of appellate
courts at the state and federal level demonstrate weekly.
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Carolina Condominium Act 1 6 and legislation addressing time-share
ownership. 117
Now let's move on to the second semester of real property. This
semester deals with "the real estate transaction" and all that is
included in that concept. Traditionally, the semester kicks off with a
discussion of the common law statute of frauds. In North Carolina, of
course, this brings the students to the unique "no part performance"
view of the statute as it has in generations past. Once again, the law
student of the new millennium must grapple with much more than his
or her predecessor students. The advent of the Internet, World Wide
Web, e-mail and computerized research has added a comprehensive
new area of concern to the formerly quaint study of the statute of
frauds."" Students can no longer stop after reading N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 22-2 and a handful of key appellate court decisions. The North Car-
olina Uniform Electronic Transactions Act 1 9 and its federal E-Sign
counterpart 12° now increase in significant ways the amount of infor-
mation that must be processed by each law student.
The law dealing with real estate brokers, once a relatively uncom-
plicated area of sellers' agents and subagents and their duties under
the law of agency, has been transformed into a greatly expanded field
of law involving sellers agents, buyers agents and dual agents. 121 Once
again, more statutes and administrative regulations must be reckoned
with by the new millennium law student. Indeed, almost every aspect
of the real estate transaction has become more complex: title insurance
coverage, formats for developing land beyond the simple fee simple
transfer or ground lease,122 legislation dealing with interstate land
116. Chapter 47C of the North Carolina General Statutes.
117. Article 4, Chapter 93A of the North Carolina General Statutes.
118. The Internet information revolution has added an entirely new dimension and
area requiring at least minimum competence to the law school curriculum. Law
students must be able to accomplish legal research tasks using the Internet.
Technological competence levels now expected was not required of law students of
past generations. See, for example, two recent articles in the July/August ABA Probate
& Property Journal: Patrick A. Randolf Jr., Has E-sign Murdered the Statute of Frauds?
(page 23), and William P. Gardella, E-commerce in Real Estate Transactions (page 44).
119. Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, Chapter 66, Art. 40 of the North Carolina
General Statutes.
120. Electronic Signatures In Global And National Commerce, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7002 et
seq. (2000).
121. See Hetrick et al, North Carolina Real Estate Manual (2000-2001), published
by the North Carolina Real Estate Commission. Chapter 8 contains an extensive
discussion of agency relationships. Chapter 10 reviews agency contracts and
practices.
122. Synthetic leases as financing devices, for example.
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sales, 12 3 a comprehensive marketable title act 124 with a multitude of
exceptions (that rob it of much of its effectiveness),125 the proliferation
of complex overlays of land use controls and zoning laws, 126 environ-
mental considerations, 127 wetlands laws and issues, 28 significant con-
stitutional issues involving the question of takings, 129 and, once again,
fair housing legislation.
130
As suggested above, the Property I and II courses have been
selected because I have taught them for almost three decades and am
well aware of the transformation that has taken place in those courses.
It is important to add that it is impossible to do much more than men-
tion some of the many new laws and developments in real property
law in the basic courses. Exploration of many issues must be reserved
for advanced seminars. But my defense of the law student of the new
millennium to the "old guard" of the practicing bar should at this point
emphasize that what has been written above about the basic property
courses can be written about any of the core curriculum courses in a
law school curriculum. Things truly "ain't what they used to be"; they
are significantly more complex and involved. My point in sojourning
into a defense of the new millennium law student includes a thought
that those who have the responsibility for the enactment and repeal of
legislation should consider the impact of that legislation on the cur-
rent system of legal education.
123. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1701 et seq. (2000).
124. Chapter 47B.
125. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47B-3.
126. Federal, state and local land use controls are legion. Citations to applicable
laws and regulations could exceed the length of this article.
127. A basic understanding of the environmental considerations in real estate
acquisition and development, including at least rudimentary coverage of due
diligence, is important. Commencing with the 1986 amendments to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 et seq., due diligence in environmental matters has
become an important element in commercial real estate transactions.
128. See, for example, the many-faceted rules related to wetlands and the landmark
decision of Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001); the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 et seq.
129. The trilogy of Nolan, Dollan & Lucas and the hundreds of cases interpreting
those landmark cases must be studied. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987);
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
130. Fair housing laws should be cross referenced and stressed throughout the
property law courses during discussion of the areas of landlord and tenant, real estate
brokerage, contracts to convey, and mortgage financing.
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G. Empathy For The General Practitioner
If my discussion above might be summarized as the plight of the
new millennium law student, it is equally applicable to what we might
call the challenge to the new millennium general practitioner. While
the current practicing bar of this nation includes more specialists than
ever before, it remains bar dominated in numbers at least by general
practitioners. In every area where law students must now consider
this multitude of new statutes, the general practitioner must also tread.
In this regard, I suggest that the general practitioner will become an
endangered species because of trends in legislation that include the
following: (1) there is a tendency not to repeal or clarify obsolete,
archaic and confusing statutes; (2) there is an increase in the use of
ambiguous words and terms in new statutes; (3) even well drafted stat-
utes trigger numerous issues of statutory interpretation; (4) there is an
increase in the comprehensive uniform act type of statute that often
occupies an entire chapter of the General Statutes; and, (5) statutes
appear to be drafted without regard to the transactional cost of utiliz-
ing the statute as a consideration.
H. Aunt Murphy's Attic
One of the fun things about old houses is that they have a feature
rare in many modern ones: attics, and full-sized ones, not those sissy
little crawl spaces of today. Aunt Murphy lived in a large, stone farm-
house only two blocks from our family home in Milwaukee. To the
delight of the many Hetrick children, a narrow and steep span of
ancient stairs led up from the second floor to a huge and wonderful
attic and another world (or at least another era). On a rainy or sub-
zero day, the attic was a top-of-the-list adventure for a bored kid. It
boasted one of those floor-model radios that had long since ceased to
work, but the dials made an excellent control panel for a spaceship or
submarine. Trunks of various sizes and designs held mementos of the
past-old photos, newspapers, certificates, and road maps. In and
upon a dust-covered dresser an eclectic collection of things could be
found, including an old hand-operated hair clipper, dented trombone,
and a handwritten notebook of the "Nature Boys" club meetings of
decades past in the north woods of the upper peninsula of Michigan.
Old clothes hung on hangers attached to makeshift nail spikes ham-
mered into the log-beams that supported the roof. Funny-looking
shoes were everywhere, a waist-and-up mannequin on a wood pedestal
sat in a prominent location with sewing pins and a few scraps of mate-
rial still in place. Floor lamps and table lamps of all kinds also
accounted for part of the attic inventory. Even years later during my
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college days, an occasional trip up those stairs to the attic was thera-
peutic, as I would peek through the attic door and make a mental note:
"Yeah, the stuff is still there."
The statute books of any state, certainly the voluminous tomes of
federal laws, and the North Carolina General Statutes have their own
versions of Aunt Murphy's attic. Because there is space available, laws
that are not really needed are kept on the books. There is even a com-
fort level at retaining some of them. After all, there must be a reason
why each is in there, and you never know when you might need a given
law again.
1 3 1
Every state's set of laws includes an unfortunate accumulation of
some really awful 132 examples of statutes. Time to get rid of them!
None but a few experts can comprehend their meaning. They add
nothing to the day-to-day achievement of justice, they render the law a
mysterious thing, and they occasionally result in time-consuming and
expensive legislation. The Neighborhood Public Roads statute, dis-
cussed earlier in his article, should be repealed or at least placed in
some type of "archive" status. The most effective way to interpret that
statute is with a ouija board. The Cartway Statute gives itself away by
its title.' 33 I picture myself walking some day through a jurispruden-
tial junkyard where these and other statutes lie in repose, rusting well
and disturbing nobody. Other statutes are crystal clear but irrelevant
to modern society. N.C. Gen. Stat. 42-24, for example, makes Chapter
42 of the General Statutes applicable "to all leases or contracts to lease
turpentine trees, or use lightwood for purposes of making tar.
134
IV. CONCLUSION
Legislation, both existing and proposed, should be consumer-ori-
ented. By this I mean client-oriented, efficiency-oriented, and user-
friendly. By this I mean not pure theory-centered, lawyer-centered,
government-centered or judge-centered. The client-consumer is inter-
131. Aunt Murphy's attic stuff was eventually sold without her permission at a
rummage sale by her month-to-month tenants. She quickly recovered from the loss.
132. Apparently the word "awful" once meant "awe-full" or inspiring awe. These
statutes inspire awe only in the sense that they are incomprehensible no matter how
many times one reads them.
133. Invariably, a first-year law student will ask: "What's a cartway?" "Full or
empty?" I reply.
134. SamuelJohnson once astutely observed: "Laws are formed by the manners and
exigencies of particular times, and it is but accidental that they last longer than their
causes." M. Frances McNamara, 2,000 Classic Legal Quotations 388 (Lawyers
Cooperative Publishing 1992) (quoting, of course, Samuel Johnson, Boswell, Life of
Johnson: 1776).
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ested in a prompt and cost-effective resolution of his or her problem or
dispute. The consumer would be pleased to see less notices, warnings,
and disclosures that supposedly inform and protect and more afforda-
ble justice. Clearly, "justice" as conceived in theory by an expert or
scholar may not be "justice" to the citizen-user of the law in question.
Legislation should be able to withstand a performance-based review at
the grassroots, local, first level of a legal dispute or problem. The tre-
mendous capabilities of computer technology should be utilized to
assess the actual effect of statutes, including unintended conse-
quences, and to monitor how statutes are used and construed at the
trial court level. The General Statutes of North Carolina need a thor-
ough and systematic housecleaning. Statutes provide the fundamental
framework for much of our system of justice. To clutter the statute
books with obsolete, confusing and unnecessary laws serves to trivial-
ize the important, frustrate members of the public, confuse practicing
lawyers, complicate the legal education of future lawyers, and add
unnecessary expense to the process by which legal problems and dis-
putes are resolved in society.
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